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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the final agency action pursuant to U.C.A. 
§§ 63-46b-16(l) and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the decision of the Division of Health Care Financing to deny 
reimbursement for lack of prior authorization is contrary to law and prior practice, is an 
abuse of discretion, and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm7i, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991). 
Record of Issue: Raised and decided in agency hearing. (Transcript of Hearing of 
Aug. 12, 1998, hereafter "Tr.," at 21, 29; Recommended Decision, hereafter "Rec. Dec," 
R. 115, 117.) 
2. Whether the agency decision to deny retroactive authorization for the 
transplant is contrary to law and prior agency practice, is an abuse of discretion, or is 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 
858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
Record of Issue: Raised and decided in agency hearing. (Tr. 69-70; Rec. Dec, R. 
117.) 
3. Whether the Division of Health Care Financing is equitably estopped to require 
prior authorization, based on its initial misrepresentations that the patient was not 
Medicaid eligible and its prior practice of notifying the Hospital of eligibility 
determinations. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 864 
P.2d 904, 908-09 (Utah App. 1993); Savage Industries, Inc., supra. 
Record of Issue: Raised and decided in agency hearing. (Tr. 101; Rec. Dec, R. 
117-19.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
This Court's review of the agency action is governed by U.C.A. § 63-46b-16. The 
substantive standards for reimbursement of the transplant costs are set forth in 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1396d(a)(4)(B) and (r)(5); U.C.A. §§ 26-18-2.3 and -3; and Utah Admin. Code 
R414-1-22 and -25(6), R410-14-2(1)0), R414-10A-4(5), R414-10A-6, R414-10A-9 
(1997), all set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 29-57.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an administrative action by Primary Children's Hospital for reimbursement 
of the $250,000-cost of a bone marrow transplant performed on a 5-year-old Medicaid 
patient, Sean Daugaard. (R. 2-3, 64, 93.) The medical necessity of the procedure, the 
appropriateness of care, and the Medicaid eligibility of Sean Daugaard are not in dispute. 
The Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("DHCF" or 
"Agency")* denied the request for reimbursement on the sole basis that the Hospital did 
not obtain prior authorization for the services. (R. 75.) However, the Hospital 
demonstrated at the administrative hearing that the Agency's own employee precluded 
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prior authorization by erroneously advising the Hospital that Sean Daugaard was not 
Medicaid eligible, and by failing to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected status that 
same day. Moreover, the DHCF deviated from its prior practice of granting retroactive 
authorization for medically necessary and appropriate services. The Hospital also 
demonstrated that reimbursement is required under principles of equitable estoppel. (Tr. 
13, 21-22, 69-70, 95-101.) The DHCF presented no opposing testimony. However, the 
Administrative Law Judge recommended that denial of reimbursement be affirmed, and 
the Agency director adopted that recommendation in his Final Agency Order. (R. 113-
19, Add. 1-7.) The Hospital petitioned for this Court's review of that Agency action. (R. 
125.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1997, five-year-old Sean Daugaard was admitted to Primary Children's 
Hospital for testing and treatment for suspected leukemia. A bone marrow biopsy 
confirmed a diagnosis of Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, a cancer of the white blood 
cells that destroys the immune system. The testing lab described Sean's case as 
"extremely difficult." (Pet. Exh. 1, pp. 9, 22, following R. 51, Add. 11-13.) 
Chemotherapy was commenced immediately, but symptoms persisted, and treatment was 
complicated by infectious diseases. Sean's treating physician, Dr. Roberta H. Adams, 
Director of Pediatric Blood and Marrow Transplant, concluded that a bone marrow 
transplant was necessary to save Sean's life. (Id., p. 26, Add. 14-15.) Dr. Carol 
Bruggers, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, also concluded "to pursue bone marrow 
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transplantation as definitive therapy." (Id., p. 27, Add. 16.) Search for a bone marrow 
match commenced, and Sean was scheduled to undergo the procedure as soon as the 
infectious diseases resolved and his blood counts sufficiently recovered. (Id., pp. 25-28, 
Add. 14-17.) However, Sean's parents, while accepting the need for a transplant, were 
"stressed" over insurance questions and "overwhelmed" with the financial requirements 
to meet Sean's medical needs. (Id., pp. 3, 26, Add. 9, 15.) 
Richard Fairborn, the Hospital's Resource Counselor, met with the Daugaards in 
March, at the time of the testing and diagnosis, to discuss available resources and 
funding options. He concluded that the family did not have sufficient means to pay for 
the services, and that they would be eligible for Medicaid coverage. Medicaid eligibility 
was established, and Medicaid covered the diagnostic and treatment services provided in 
the months prior to the bone marrow transplant. (Tr. 19-21, 35-36.) DHCF records 
show that Sean's Medicaid coverage was approved June 9, 1997, retroactive to March 1, 
1997. (Resp. Exh. 10-1, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 10-8, R. 102, 105-07, 110, Add. 23-28.) 
Sean was admitted to the Hospital for his bone marrow transplant on July 8, 1997. 
After a period of observation and testing, he was scheduled to undergo several days of 
pre-transplant conditioning therapy, in which diseased marrow is destroyed by radiation 
and drugs before the new marrow is actually injected. (Pet. Exh. 1, pp. 26, 28, Add. 15-
17; Tr. 11, 19.) On July 9, before the conditioning therapy had begun, Richard Fairborn 
checked the computer database of the DHCF to verify Sean's Medicaid eligibility before 
submitting the request for prior authorization that was required for Medicaid coverage of 
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the transplant. He was surprised to see that the system showed Sean as no longer 
Medicaid eligible. Mr. Fairborn immediately went to Debbie Lucero, the Medicaid 
eligibility officer for DHCF, who had an office right in the Hospital for the convenience 
of Hospital patients and staff. Mr. Fairborn asked Ms. Lucero why Sean appeared to be 
ineligible for Medicaid coverage, when he had been eligible for the past several months. 
Ms. Lucero confirmed that Sean was no longer eligible, and that no Medicaid card had 
been sent to the Daugaard family in July because their status was under review. She 
advised Mr. Fairborn that a new application would have to be submitted for the family in 
order to reestablish their Medicaid eligibility. In compliance with those instructions, Mr. 
Fairborn immediately went to Sean's room and had Mrs. Daugaard complete a new 
Medicaid application, which Mr. Fairborn then personally delivered to Ms. Lucero that 
same day. (Tr. 20-22, 25-28; Resp. Exh. 10-6, showing "no card for July 97," R. 107, 
Add. 27.) 
Mr. Fairborn noted on his own computer record for July 9 that the Daugaard 
Medicaid application was pending with Debbie Lucero, and then waited for her response. 
Ms. Lucero had routinely provided Mr. Fairborn with immediate personal notification of 
eligibility determinations on pending cases. However, Ms. Lucero never did act on the 
application or respond to Mr. Fairborn in this case. Instead, later on July 9, Ms. Lucero 
unilaterally concluded that the Daugaards' eligibility was unchanged and simply 
authorized issuance of a Medicaid card for July 1997, resuming the unbroken coverage 
from March 1. (Tr. 25-30, 58-60, 91; Pet. Exh. 3, R. 54, Add. 18; Resp. Exh. 10-1 
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(showing case action on July 9), 10-6 (showing authorization of July card on July 9), 10-
8 (showing mailing of card July 10, 1997), R. 102, 107, 110, Add. 23, 27-28.) 
Meanwhile, without knowing that Sean's Medicaid eligibility had been reinstated, the 
Hospital could not submit a request for prior authorization of his transplant. Medicaid 
eligibility must precede a request for Medicaid coverage. However, given the gravity of 
Sean's condition, the Hospital proceeded with Sean's treatment and transplant, with the 
expectation of obtaining retroactive authorization and reimbursement once Sean's 
Medicaid eligibility was reestablished. This expectation was based on DHCF's prior 
practice of granting retroactive authorization in such cases, when Medicaid eligibility 
could not be established prior to the date of service. (Tr. 68-70.) Sean's bone marrow 
transplant procedure was successfully completed on July 17, 1997. (Resp. Exh. 3, R. 
63, Add. 21.)1 
The Hospital did not learn that Sean's Medicaid eligibility had been reestablished 
until August 1, 1997, when Mr. Fairborn was conducting a routine review of his pending 
cases. At that time, the DHCF Medicaid database showed that Sean had been eligible for 
all of July 1997, with no break in coverage. Mr. Fairborn noted that fact in his own 
computer file. (Tr. 23, 28-30, 37-38, 49-50, 57-60; Pet. Exh. 4, R. 55, Add. 19.) Mr. 
The Administrative Law Judge erroneously found that Debbie Lucero mailed a letter to the 
Daugaards on July 9 confirming their eligibility status. (Rec. Dec, Finding No. 10, R. 116, Add. 4.) 
Respondent's Exhibit 10-4, cited by the ALJ, is the original eligibility confirmation letter of June 9, 
acknowledging Medicaid coverage from March 1. (R. 105, Add. 24.) No new eligibility letter was 
mailed on July 9. Based on the Agency's position that Sean's Medicaid eligibility was unbroken 
throughout his hospital stay, no new eligibility letter was necessary. 
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Fairborn then asked Debbie Lucero and her successor why the DHCF database had 
shown Sean as ineligible on July 9, but currently showed unbroken coverage from March 
1 to the present. They explained that it was due to a "rollover" in the computer data, and 
that the computer simply needed to be updated on July 9 to show continuing eligibility. 
(Tr. 30-31, 46, 58-59.) 
Sean remained in the Hospital for observation, to allow his immune system to 
recover, until September 19, 1997. (Resp. Exh. 3, R. 63, Add. 21.) On that same day, 
the Hospital prepared its request for retroactive authorization and reimbursement for 
Sean's bone marrow transplant. (Resp. Exh. 4, R. 64, Add. 22.) The DHCF Case 
Summary log shows receipt of this "request for retro-pa[y] for transplant." (Pet. Exh. 5, 
R. 58, Add. 20.) That same log, in a note dated 11/14/97, recommends denial of 
reimbursement based on several listed regulations, all of which pertain to medical 
documentation supporting the transplant, and none of which pertains to prior 
authorization of the transplant. (Id.; Regulations, Resp. Exh. 9, R. 77, 79-82.) The 
DHCF issued a written denial of reimbursement, dated December 24, 1997, based on 
"Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria." (Resp. Exh. 5, R. 65.) The Hospital 
responded with a request for hearing, attaching a letter from Sean's physician, Dr. 
Adams, demonstrating that all required supporting medical documentation had been 
provided. (R. 1-3.) The DHCF initially denied the request for hearing as untimely, even 
though the request was patently within the 30-day time limit, but then issued an amended 
denial of reimbursement, adding lack of prior authorization as a reason. (R. 16,27.) The 
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Hospital submitted another request for hearing, which was granted and ultimately 
scheduled for August 12, 1998. (R. 25, 42.) However, on July 23, 1998, just three 
weeks before the hearing, the DHCF issued a second amended denial of reimbursement, 
this time dropping all medical grounds for denial and listing only the lack of prior 
authorization. (Resp. Exh. 8, R. 75.) 
At the administrative hearing, the Hospital demonstrated, through the testimony of 
Richard Fairborn, that the Hospital was precluded from obtaining prior authorization by 
the misinformation from Debbie Lucero that Sean was not Medicaid eligible. The 
Hospital also demonstrated, through Sean's medical records and the testimony of 
Bernadette McNally, Transplant Program Coordinator, that the Hospital proceeded with 
Sean's transplant out of medical necessity, to save his life, and with the reasonable 
expectation of reimbursement, based on prior DHCF practice. The DHCF responded 
with absolutely no opposing testimony. Counsel for the DHCF simply produced the data 
from the Agency computer system (Resp. Exh. 10, Add. 23-28), without any advance 
notice or production, ' 'testified11 himself regarding the content of the documents, over the 
pleas of Hospital counsel that he at least be placed under oath, and then rested his case. 
(Tr. 43-56.) DHCF counsel simply argued that because Sean was, in fact, Medicaid 
eligible at all times, the Hospital should have known his true status and obtained prior 
authorization. (Tr. 92-94.) The administrative law judge("ALJ"), an employee of the 
Department of Health, accepted that reasoning in recommending that denial of 
reimbursement be affirmed. (R. 115, Add. 3.) The Director of DHCF adopted the 
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recommended decision, without further analysis, as the Final Agency Order. (R. 113, 
Add. 1.) The Hospital seeks judicial review of that order. (R. 125.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Federal law mandates Medicaid coverage of transplants for eligible minor 
patients. Lack of prior authorization is not a valid basis to deny Medicaid payment for 
transplantation services that are medically necessary and appropriate. No statute or rule 
authorizes withholding payment for necessary and appropriate services based on lack of 
prior authorization. 
The Agency waived, or the Hospital should be deemed to have satisfied, prior 
authorization because the Agency's own misrepresentations regarding Sean's eligibility 
status prevented the Hospital from obtaining prior authorization. Equity and justice 
entitle the Hospital to relief when the Agency's own conduct precluded prior 
authorization. 
The Agency had a legal duty to correct its prior misinformation or to inform the 
Hospital of Sean's corrected status in order to permit prior authorization. The Agency's 
failure to so notify the Hospital was an unjustified departure from prior Agency practice. 
The Hospital had no duty to presume or discover the Agency's error in order to obtain 
prior authorization. The Agency made no findings of fact, and there is no evidence, to 
support the conclusion of law that the Hospital should have known of Sean's true 
eligibility status. 
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The Agency's denial of retroactive authorization is contrary to prior practice, is 
without support in the findings and evidence, is an abuse of discretion, and is otherwise 
arbitrary and capricious. The Agency's own rules and practice provide for retroactive 
authorization in cases such as the present. The Agency's conclusion that this case does 
not present "unusual circumstances," to justify application of the prior authorization 
exception, is unsupported by the findings and the evidence. 
The Agency is equitably estopped to deny payment in this case because the 
Hospital reasonably relied on Agency representations that Sean was not Medicaid 
eligible, and to allow the Agency to now take the position that the Hospital should have 
known of Sean's continuous eligibility produces a serious injury and injustice to the 
Hospital. The Agency's conclusion that this case is not of "sufficient gravity" to apply 
equitable estoppel is not supported by the findings or the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program providing medical assistance to eligible 
low-income individuals and families. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 and 1396a-v (1998 Supp.). 
The objective of Medicaid is to enable each state "to furnish medical assistance to 
individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary 
medical services." Peterson v. Utah Dept. of Health, 969 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1998), 
quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). Participating states must establish a 
Medicaid plan that complies with all federal statutes and regulations. The state plan must 
provide reasonable standards and procedures for coverage of specified medical services. 
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Id; Greenstein v. Bane, 833 F. Supp. 1054, 1060 (D.N.Y. 1993). Generally, Medicaid 
payments are made by the state directly to the entity providing the service rather than to 
the recipient of the service. The purpose of this "vendor payment principle is to ensure 
that providers will be reimbursed for services they furnish recipients, thereby eliminating 
disincentives in providing such services based on the fear of nonpayment." Greenstein, 
supra, at 1060. The federal government reimburses the state for a specified percentage 
of the funds expended on the covered services. Peterson, supra, at 5. See generally 
Bleazardv. UtahDept of Health, 861 P.2d 1048, 1049-51 (Utah App. 1993); Allen v. 
Department of Health, 829 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1992), affd, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah 
1993). 
Utah participates in the Medicaid program through its own Medical Assistance 
Act. U.C.A. §§ 26-18-1 etseq. The Division of Health Care Financing is authorized to 
administer the state program and is required to adopt implementing policy in 
conformance with applicable federal law. 26-18-2.1, 26-18-3(2). The DHCF is required 
to ensure that Medicaid services are necessary and appropriate, and that high quality care 
is provided to recipients in the most cost-effective manner possible. 26-18-2.3(1). 
General provisions of the state Medicaid plan are found in the Utah Administrative Code 
*tBA\4-l etseq. (Add. 47.) 
The federal Medicaid statute identifies seven different categories of services that a 
state plan must provide to eligible individuals. See42U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). These 
services include, but are not limited to, inpatient hospital services, nursing services, 
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physician services, and early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment 
("EPSDT") services for qualified recipients under age twenty-one. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(a)(l)-(5). The term EPSDT services is defined to include "[s]uch other necessary 
health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures described in subsection (a) 
of this section to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and 
conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are 
covered under the State plan" 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (emp. added) (Add. 37). This 
provision has been interpreted to mandate Medicaid coverage for all medically necessary 
treatment for eligible recipients under age twenty-one, including organ and bone marrow 
transplants. See Pittman v. Secretary, Florida DHRS, 998 F.2d 887, 889, 892 (11 th Cir.), 
cert, den., 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993) (requiring payment for minor's liver-bowel transplant); 
Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 725 (4 th Cir. 1993) (requiring payment for minor's 
heart transplant); McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Fla. 1992). 
Moreover, transplantation services and coverage must be provided without 
discrimination among similarly situated individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(l). 
The state Medicaid plan also mandates coverage of EPSDT services, including 
transplantation services, for eligible individuals under age twenty-one. R414-l-6(2)(e); 
R414-10A-4(1) and -5(1). Consistent with federal requirements, these services must be 
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provided without discrimination among similarly situated recipients. U.C.A. § 26-18-
3(2); Rule R414-1-5.2 
POINT I: THE AGENCY DECISION TO DENY REIMBURSEMENT FOR 
LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND PRIOR PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IS 
OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
A. Lack of Prior Authorization Is Not A Valid Basis to Withhold Payment. 
The Agency's second amended notice of denial, dated July 23, 1998, is based 
solely on lack of prior authorization, citing R414-10A-6(1). (R. 75.) That provision 
states only that "[p]rior authorization is required for all transplantation services," with 
exceptions not relevant here. However, that rule has never been applied by the Agency 
to withhold reimbursement for "reasonable and necessary" services to an eligible 
recipient. In fact, as noted, lack of prior authorization was not even considered as a basis 
to deny payment in the Agency's initial decision. Because the service is mandated by 
federal law, Pittman, supra, the Agency has no discretion to deny payment for admittedly 
appropriate services. 
The stated purpose of prior authorization is to verify that services are "reasonable 
and necessary." See U.C.A. § 26-18-2.3(2)(a). Stated otherwise, prior authorization 
2
 Rule R414-10A-1(3) characterizes transplantation services as discretionary, citing an unreported 
federal case, McDaniel v. Be tit, Case No. 96405 (D. Utah 1996). However, this interpretation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) is contrary to that of the federal cases cited in the text, and this Court is not bound 
by the McDaniel court's interpretation of federal law. Modern Supply Co. v. Federal Savings & Loan 
Ins. Corp., 748 P.2d 251, 254 (Wash. App. 1987) (when lower federal courts are divided on the 
interpretation of a federal statute, state courts are free to decide the question for themselves). In any 
event, the Agency in the present case does not dispute that the state Medicaid plan covers transplantation 
services; therefore, the Agency is bound to ensure that coverage is uniform among all eligible recipients. 
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helps ensure that Medicaid resources are properly utilized for appropriate services. See 
Laddv. Thomas, 962 F. Supp. 284, 294 (D. Conn. 1997). Consistent with that purpose, 
the statute defining DHCF duties provides that the Agency may deny a provider's claim 
only when the services rendered "fail to meet criteria established by the division 
concerning medical necessity or appropriateness.'" 26-18-2.3(1) (emp. added). Neither 
the statutes nor the regulations authorize withholding payment for lack of prior 
authorization alone, once medical necessity and appropriateness are satisfied. In fact, 
Rule R414-l-25(6) states that "prior authorization must not be used as a substitute for 
regulatory practice that should be in rule." (Add. 51.) In the absence of a rule, providers 
are still motivated to obtain prior authorization because, without it, they assume the risk 
that services provided may subsequently be found unnecessary or inappropriate, and 
payment be denied for that reason, not for lack of prior authorization itself Accordingly, 
in a case like the present, where medical necessity and appropriateness of care are 
conceded, and the recipient's eligibility is unquestioned, lack of prior authorization is not 
a valid or permissible basis to deny coverage. 
B. The Agency's Misrepresentation Effected A Waiver of Prior Authorization. 
In any event, the Agency should be deemed to have waived the prior authorization 
requirement because its own misinformation prevented compliance. Debbie Lucero's 
statement to Richard Fairborn on July 9 that Sean was not Medicaid eligible prevented 
the Hospital from obtaining prior authorization. The prior authorization form could not 
be submitted until after eligibility was established. (Tr. 68-70.) If Ms. Lucero had 
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correctly explained, as she did on August 1, that Sean's eligibility status was unchanged 
and simply had to be updated in the computer, the Hospital could easily have submitted 
the prior authorization form on July 9. Alternatively, if Ms. Lucero, consistent with her 
prior practice, had simply notified Mr. Fairbom of her internal computer up-date on July 
9, to show Sean's continuing eligible status, the Hospital could have submitted the 
required form that same day. Either way, with correct information, the simple form could 
have been faxed to the Agency that same day, with the detailed supporting 
documentation to be submitted later. (Tr. 93-94.) See Rule R414-10A-6(2).3 
On these unusual facts, the few similar cases that could be found support payment 
for the service rendered. For example, in Society of the New York Hospital v. Mogensen, 
319 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Misc. 1971), revyd and modified on other grounds, 373 N.Y.S.2d 722 
(App. 1972), the hospital provided medical services to a financially needy patient, but 
failed to submit a timely request for Medicaid reimbursement because the hospital was 
not informed of the patient's Medicaid eligible status until after the time for submission 
had expired. The court held that the hospital was entitled to reimbursement because the 
patient was admittedly approved for Medicaid coverage, the state could still obtain 
reimbursement from the federal government, and the time limit for submission of 
provider claims must be read to presume provider knowledge of patient eligibility. Id. at 
3
 The Agency takes the position that the prior authorization form could have been submitted at any 
time up to the actual bone marrow injection on July 17. (Tr. 92-93.) Under that assumption, Ms. Lucero 
actually had another week from July 9 to correct her misinformation, but she failed to do so, leaving the 
Hospital with the misunderstanding that Sean was still ineligible. 
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261-62. The court reasoned that "[t]he department cannot be permitted to hide behind 
these defenses under the fact pattern herein," and that "[t]he court has an obligation to 
protect the recipient herein, and must slice through the bureaucracy to insure that 
payment is made to the innocent vendor." Id. at 262-63. The same reasoning and 
conclusion are even more compelling in the present, where the Agency's own employee 
mislead the Hospital as to the recipient's true eligibility status. 
Similarly, in In re Nemis, 351 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976), a nursing home's 
claim for Medicaid reimbursement was denied because the claim was not timely 
submitted with an authorization form from the agency. The nursing home demonstrated 
that the agency had failed to provide the authorization form when requested, but the 
agency responded that the nursing home knew of the patient's eligible status and should 
have obtained the form sooner. The court held that because the purpose of the 
procedural rules was to screen invalid claims, and there was no dispute as to the patient's 
eligibility or the propriety of services rendered, the claim should not be denied for 
technical noncompliance with "procedural niceties." Id. at 366. The court reasoned that 
"considerations of equity and justice demand" payment: 
We cannot affirm a result which glorifies form and procedure so as to deny 
recovery for an admittedly legitimate claim. The confusion created in this 
case by a combination of factors involving dereliction by a subordinate 
agency in failing to submit [the requested] form and the misleading nature 
of the many directives . . . of the Division, are adequate reasons for 
invoking the exception contemplated by [the rules]. And this result should 
follow despite the contributory neglect of the Home and its personnel. [Id.] 
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The court concluded that "strict application of the rule to the factual pattern in this case 
was an abuse of the discretionary power of the Division, whether tested by its own rules 
or the principles of equity applied by the court." Id. at 367. 
In the present case, as well, the Agency's own misinformation created "confusion" 
as to the patient's Medicaid status, precluding technical compliance with the prior 
authorization rule. Where there is no dispute as to patient eligibility or appropriateness 
of services, the purpose of the prior authorization rule is not served by denying payment 
for those services. Due to the Agency's own action in misleading the Hospital as to the 
patient's true eligibility status, equity and justice require that the Agency be deemed to 
have waived, or be precluded from relying on, the prior authorization requirement. 
Denial of payment was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 
C. Nondisclosure of Sean's True Status Was Contrary to Prior Agency Practice. 
The Agency denied payment under the rationale that Ms. Lucero had no duty to 
inform the Hospital of Sean's corrected eligibility status, "although that had been her 
custom," and that the Hospital "was not diligent" in tracking Sean's status. (Rec. Concl. 
of Law No. 1, Add. 5.) However, this conclusion is contrary to law on both points. 
1. Agency Duty. The Administrative Procedures Act, section 63 -46b-
16(4)(h)(iii), "clearly and unambiguously requires consistency of agency action in the 
absence of an adequate rationale for departure from prior action." Pickett v. Utah Dept 
of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993). Federal law also requires that 
Medicaid assistance be provided on a uniform basis, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B), 
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particularly with respect to transplantation services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(l). The 
Hospital presented evidence that Debbie Lucero routinely notified Mr. Fairborn of 
changes in eligibility status. Mr. Fairborn testified of his expectation following 
submission of the new application to Debbie Lucero on July 9: 
Q. Did you expect or have you ever had Debbie contact you in the 
interim and let you know that a patient has become Medicaid-
eligible? 
A. Routinely she will come and let us know about eligibility, yes. 
Q. Did she contact you on this one? 
A. No. 
Q. At any time? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Was that a surprise to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why is that? 
A. Because we do work together routinely on these cases and it would 
have—it was out of the ordinary, especially where she knew we had 
an interest in this one and the magnitude of it. [Tr. 29.] 
The Agency provided no contrary evidence and no evidence demonstrating any rationale 
for departure from prior practice. 
On the basis of the undisputed evidence, the ALJ found the following fact No. 13: 
"Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairbom when cases become eligible. Although 
Ms. Lucero knew this case involved a large amount of money, she failed to inform Mr. 
Fairborn of Sean's eligibility." (Add. 5.) As noted, the ALJ also concluded, as a matter 
of law, that keeping the Hospital "apprised of new eligibility approvals . . . had been 
[Ms. Lucero's] custom." (Id.) Accordingly, under the law requiring "consistency of 
agency action," Pickett, supra, the Agency did have a legal duty to notify the Hospital of 
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Sean's corrected eligibility status. That duty was even more imperative in light of Ms. 
Lucero's prior representation that Sean was not eligible and that reinstatement of 
eligibility required action on a new application. When Ms. Lucero unilaterally updated 
Sean's eligibility status on July 9, without formal action on the new application, she had 
an affirmative duty to correct her prior misinformation to Mr. Fairborn. The result of her 
failure was to treat Sean differently from other similarly situated recipients, precluding 
payment for his case when similar cases would be covered. See also Greenstein v. Bane, 
833 F. Supp. 1054, 1071-73 (D.N.Y. 1993) (violation of Medicaid comparability 
provisions through inconsistent application of agency standards "lacks rationality and is 
arbitrary").4 
2. Hospital Diligence. In view of the Agency's duty to notify the Hospital of 
Sean's corrected eligibility status, the Hospital cannot be denied payment because of 
supposed "lack of diligence" in discovering the Agency's error for itself. The Agency's 
conclusion that the Hospital lacked diligence in discovering Sean's corrected status is 
presumably based on the arguments of Agency counsel that the DHCF updated its 
computer on July 9 to show unbroken coverage, that DHCF sent an eligibility letter to 
Daugaard's on June 9, and that a new Medicaid card was mailed to Daugaard's on July 
4
 Even in the absence of a prior pattern of Agency conduct, the Agency had a duty under due process 
principles to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected eligibility status. See, e.g., Laddv. Thomas, 962 F. 
Supp. 284, 289-90 (D. Conn. 1997) (agency duty to notify provider of action or inaction on request for 
prior authorization); Dodson v. Parham, All F. Supp. 97, 109-11 (D. Ga. 1977) (agency duty to provide 
notice of action on prior approval of payment for Medicaid drugs). 
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10. (Tr. 14-15,34-37,42-48,91-94.) However, the Agency's conclusion is not 
supported by the evidence or the findings. 
The only evidence presented by the Agency to support lack of diligence by the 
Hospital was presented in the form of document-interpretation and argument by Agency 
counsel. However, arguments and opinions of counsel do not constitute admissible 
evidence. Green v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 960 P.2d 912, 918 n.8 (Wash. 1998) 
(party submitting no opposing testimony cannot rely on counsel's arguments and 
interpretation of documents as evidence); Wilson v. Williams, 933 P.2d 757, 761 (Kan. 
1997) (opening and closing arguments of counsel are not evidence). The Agency's own 
rules require that all testimony be taken under oath, and that Agency findings cannot be 
based solely on hearsay evidence. Rule R410-14-2(l)(j)(vii)(C) and (E) (Add. 44.) The 
Agency produced no witnesses of its own, and Agency counsel simply "testified" himself 
regarding the interpretation of computer entries based on his own supposed experience as 
an Agency eligibility worker. (Tr. 45.) At different points in the hearing, the only 
"evidence" was presented in the form of a colloquy between the ALJ and Agency 
counsel regarding the interpretation of computer documents that had not yet been 
received into evidence, punctuated by interjections from an unidentified, unsworn 
Agency staff worker. (Tr. 41-53, 76-78.) Hospital counsel objected, suggesting that 
Agency counsel at least be sworn as a witness, and demonstrating through "voir dire" 
that Agency counsel did not know basic information about his own documents. Yet, the 
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documents, with counsel's unsworn interpretation, were admitted, despite a continuing 
objection that they lacked proper foundation. (Tr. 45, 53-56, 66.) 
Moreover, the ALJ made no finding of fact in support of, or even referring to, a 
supposed lack of diligence by the Hospital. The closest finding is No. 10, which 
erroneously states that the DHCF sent a letter to the Daugaards confirming Sean's 
eligibility on July P. The exhibit cited by the ALJ, Exhibit 10-4, states that the letter was 
sent June 9 (Add. 24), and that date is confirmed in Exhibit 10-6 (Add. 27). The 
Hospital does not dispute that the initial eligibility letter was sent June 9, but that letter 
does not change the undisputed fact that Sean's eligibility was suspended thereafter, 
from July 1 to July 9. (Tr. 20, 30-31, 58-59.) The Agency argues that the Hospital 
should have discovered Sean's corrected status after July P, but there is no evidence to 
support that argument. The evidence is undisputed that the Hospital had no access to the 
internal computer updates by Debbie Lucero on July 9, and that the Hospital received no 
notice of the new Medicaid card mailed out on July 10. (Tr. 34-35, 37, 48-50, 57-60.) 
Accordingly, in the absence of any finding or evidence to support the Agency's 
conclusion of lack of diligence by the Hospital, that conclusion is arbitrary and must be 
set aside. See, e.g., Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Utah App. 1991) 
(absence of adequate findings based on supporting evidence renders agency decision 
arbitrary and capricious). In any event, provider neglect does not preclude recovery for 
admittedly appropriate services to an eligible recipient. See In re Nemis, supra, 351 A.2d 
at 366. 
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In summary, the Agency may not withhold payment for lack of prior 
authorization. Alternatively, any such requirement should be deemed waived, or 
satisfied, because of the Agency's own misinformation, which it had a duty to correct. 
Moreover, the Hospital had no duty to suspect and discover the misrepresentation, and 
the Agency's conclusion to the contrary lacks supporting evidence and findings. 
POINT II: AGENCY DENIAL OF RETROACTIVE AUTHORIZATION FOR 
THE SERVICES IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND PRIOR 
PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IS 
OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The Agency's own regulations allow for retroactive authorization of Medicaid 
services. Rule R414-1-22 permits retroactive Medicaid coverage for services rendered 
up to three months preceding the application date if the recipient was eligible at the time 
of service. (Add. 50.) Rule R414-10A-4(5) specifically allows retroactive authorization 
of transplantation services: 
Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided 
under unusual, emergency circumstances may be given only when: 
(a) all Utah Medicaid criteria . . . are met; and 
(b) both the transplant center and the . . . specialist evaluation . . . are 
submitted with the recommendation . . . . [Add. 53.] 
Conditions (a) and (b) are not disputed. Consistent with these provisions for retroactive 
authorization, provider claims for payment can be submitted up to twelve months after 
the first date of service. Rule R414-24-1. 
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The Hospital presented evidence through Bernadette McNally, its Bone Marrow 
Transplant Program Manager, regarding the practice of obtaining retroactive 
authorization for transplant services when Medicaid eligibility could not be established 
prior to the service. Ms. McNally testified: 
Q. Have you, say, in the last year, had a situation where at the time of 
admission a patient was ineligible for Medicaid but later was 
determined to be eligible and then you submitted a request for 
retroactive prior authorization? Have you had that situation? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And was that approved? 
A. Yes, it was approved. [Tr. 70.] 
The Agency presented no contrary evidence and no evidence to justify departure from its 
practice in prior cases. In fact, Agency counsel conceded the practice of retroactive 
authorization in his opening argument: 
[I]n the past, the Division of Health Care Financing has on occasion, 
when a provider was unaware that a patient was going to be a Medicaid 
recipient, they have suspended the requirements for prior authorization. 
And by doing so, they have pointed to our—the transplant rule R414-10A-4, 
subparagraph 5, talking about post-transplant authorization under unusual 
or emergency circumstances. 
And basically that has boiled down to a situation where the 
provider—there was no way possible they could have known that the patient 
was Medicaid-eligible, after the fact they required authorization and it was 
granted based upon the fact that Medicaid eligibility was not established. 
And so we've -we've done that in the past. [Tr. 15-16, emp. added.] 
Those very circumstances exist in this case. The Hospital was unaware of Sean's 
eligibility because the Agency represented that he was not eligible. 
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Despite the undisputed evidence of prior practice, the Agency concluded that 
retroactive authorization was not justified in this case for the sole reason that the facts do 
"not rise to the level of unusual circumstances." (Rec. Concl. of Law No. 2, Add. 5.) 
However, that conclusion is not based on any evidence or finding of fact. Rather, it is 
based on the opinion of Agency counsel, presented in opening arguments, that this case is 
not "unusual" because "Sean had a history of Medicaid eligibility" and "it was 
unreasonable" for the Hospital not to know that he was eligible. (Rec. Dec. p. 4, Add. 
6.) Because the Agency's conclusion is based entirely on the unsupported opinion of 
Agency counsel, and is not supported by any finding of fact, it must be set aside. See 
Green and Wilson, supra (arguments and opinions of lawyers do not constitute 
admissible evidence); Adams v. Board of Review, supra, 821 P.2d at 4-6 (failure of 
agency to make supporting findings of fact renders its conclusions arbitrary and 
capricious). Moreover, the Agency's unjustified departure from prior practice requires 
reversal as a matter of law. See Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, supra, 858 P.2d at 
191. 
The Hospital's course of action was not "unreasonable" under the "unusual 
circumstances" of this case. Mr. Fairborn asked Ms. Lucero on July 9 if Sean was 
Medicaid eligible; she responded that he was not, and that a new application was 
required. In compliance with Agency direction, Mr. Fairborn submitted a new 
application that same day. Mr. Fairborn had no reason to question or disbelieve Ms. 
Lucero; the public has no duty to presume that government officers are untruthful. 
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Moreover, as set forth above, the past course of dealing with Ms. Lucero justified Mr. 
Fairborn in accepting her information as true and in waiting for her further response. 
The Agency presented no evidence that misinformation by its officers is anything but 
"unusual"; indeed, if misinformation were not unusual the Agency would be operating 
contrary to law and its continued existence would be in jeopardy. As held on similar 
facts in In re Nemis, supra, 351 A.2d at 366, misleading agency action, or inaction, that 
creates confusion in the attempted compliance with complex agency regulations justifies 
application of regulatory exceptions. The circumstances in this case are unusual in that 
the Agency provided false information that Sean was not Medicaid eligible, required a 
new application that was never processed, reinstated Sean's eligibility without notifying 
the Hospital, and then denied retroactive authorization, contrary to prior practice, even 
though the services were admittedly necessary and appropriate. 
Accordingly, the exception for post transplant authorization in R414-10A-4(5) 
plainly applies. The Agency's refusal to apply that exception is contrary to prior 
practice, is without support in the findings and evidence, is an abuse of discretion, and is 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT III: THE AGENCY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED TO DENY PAYMENT 
FOR LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OF THE 
TRANSPLANT SERVICES. 
Equitable estoppel may be asserted against a state agency in "unusual 
circumstances 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require."' Eldredge v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd9 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990). Application of 
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equitable estoppel is appropriate in such cases when the facts are clear and "the injustice 
to be suffered is of sufficient gravity." Id. The elements for equitable estoppel are (1) a 
statement, act, or inaction by the agency inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party in reliance on the agency's initial 
position; and (3) injury would result from allowing the agency to act contrary to its initial 
position. Id. For example, in Eldredge, this Court held that the State Retirement Board 
was equitably estopped to require a retiree to "purchase" a portion of his retirement 
benefit when he had been informed prior to his retirement that no purchase was 
necessary. Id. See also Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah App. 
1993). 
The elements of equitable estoppel are satisfied in this case. On July 9, the 
Agency's Medicaid eligibility list showed Sean Daugaard as ineligible. On direct inquiry 
that same day, the Agency told the Hospital that Sean was not Medicaid eligible and that 
a new application would have to be processed. In reliance on those two sources of 
Agency information, the Hospital withheld a prior authorization request form, and instead 
submitted a Medicaid application form. As a further basis for estoppel, the Hospital 
waited for a response from the Agency, in reliance on the Agency's prior practice of 
providing immediate notice of eligibility determinations. As a result of its reliance on 
Agency information and prior practice, the Hospital waited to submit an authorization 
form until it learned that Sean was in fact Medicaid eligible. The Agency has now 
changed its positions, asserting that Sean was eligible all along, and that the Hospital 
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should have known or taken other steps to learn that the Agency's information was false. 
If the Agency is thus permitted to change its positions, the Hospital will be financially 
injured by the denial of reimbursement for admittedly reasonable and necessary medical 
services. Applying this Court's reasoning in Eldredge, supra, a government body 
charged with administering a program as important as Medicaid "bears a most stringent 
duty to abstain from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." 795 P.2d at 676. To 
permit the Agency "to disavow its representations would work a serious and manifest 
injustice" on the Hospital. Id. By contrast, neither the Agency nor the public is "unduly 
threatened or damaged by estoppel," id., because the Agency can still obtain statutory 
reimbursement from the federal government. 
Other similar cases support application of equitable estoppel in this case. In 
Society of the New York Hospital v. Mogensen, supra, in which the hospital delayed a 
request for payment because it was unaware of the recipient's Medicaid eligibility, the 
court held that the agency was equitably estopped to deny payment: 
The department's own actions in approving the recipient and his wife for 
Medicaid estop it from asserting any defense or defenses which merely 
seek to delay a final adjudication. [319 N.Y.S.2d at 262.] 
Given the fair value of the services rendered, the court acknowledged the need to "slice 
through the bureaucracy to insure that payment is made to the innocent vendor." Id. 
Moreover, the state was not prejudiced by application of estoppel because there is no 
limitations period on the state's right to federal reimbursement. Id. Likewise, in 
Magnantv. Ambulatory Renal Services, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1029 (Ind. App. 1991), the 
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state Medicaid administrator withheld payments for dialysis transportation services 
because of suspected fraudulent Medicaid claims. However, the court held that the 
agency was equitably estopped to withhold payment because it had previously approved 
the services. Id. at 1033-34. 
In this case, the Agency concluded that equitable estoppel should not apply 
because the Hospital's actions were not "entirely reasonable" and "the injustice to be 
suffered is [not] of sufficient gravity." (Rec. Dec, p. 5, Add. 7; see Concl. of Law No. 
2.) Specifically, the Agency concluded that because Sean had a history of Medicaid 
eligibility, the Hospital should have known that his eligibility would be reinstated. (Id.) 
However, again, the Agency's conclusion is wholly unsupported by the findings of fact 
and the evidence. 
No finding of fact suggests that the Hospital's knowledge of Sean's previous 
eligibility should have led the Hospital to assume that the Agency's information was 
false and that a request for prior authorization should be submitted anyway. Obviously, 
past Medicaid eligibility does not ensure future eligibility, as financial and family 
circumstances can change over time. According to the Agency, that is precisely why 
Sean's record showed no eligibility on July 9; his status required review before it could 
be reinstated. (Tr. 30-31.) Nor is there any finding or evidence to suggest that the 
Agency would not act on the new application submitted July 9. As set forth in Point I, 
above, the duty of action was on the Agency to correct its prior misinformation, not on 
the Hospital to discover the falsity of the information. Any suggestion to the contrary 
28 
comes only from arguments of Agency counsel, and is not based on any sworn testimony. 
Accordingly, the Agency's conclusion must be set aside. See Adams v. Board of Review, 
supra, 821 P.2d at 4-6 (absence of adequate findings renders conclusion arbitrary and 
capricious); Wilson v. Williamsy supra, 933 P.2d at 761 (arguments of counsel are not 
evidence). 
Finally, the notion that the injustice and injury suffered here is not sufficiently 
grave to invoke equitable estoppel is also arbitrary and without support. The $250,000 
owed for the services rendered here is far more than the additional $25,000 that justified 
application of estoppel in Eldredge. 795 P.2d at 674. Equally important, however, is the 
message sent to medical providers who, if this decision is left uncorrected, will be less 
willing to risk providing emergency services to patients in need, with the resulting loss to 
society and impairment of the Medicaid program. See Greenstein v. Bane, supra, 833 F. 
Supp. at 1060 (vendor payment principle eliminates disincentive to provide services 
based on fear of nonpayment). 
In summary, the unusual circumstances of this case justify application of equitable 
estoppel to accomplish justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the Final Agency Order and 
direct the DHCF to reimburse the Hospital for medical services rendered to Sean 
Daugaard. 
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BY. , . 
Midnael Deily, Director 
Division of Health Care Fina; 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
00O00— 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL/ : 
SEAN DAUGAARD 
Petitioner, 
vs. RECOMMENDED DECISION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH : Case No. 98-033-47 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE Margaret J. Clark 
FINANCING, : Administrative Law Judge 
Respondent. : 
Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administrative 
Hearing Procedures Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a 
formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on August 12, 1998, at 
9:30 a.m., in Room 344, Cannon Health Building. 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake-City, 
Utah 84116, Margaret J. Clark, Administrative Law Judge, presiding. The petitioner was 
represented by David Erickson, Attorney at Law. The respondent was represented by Robert 
Stewart, Staff Attorney for the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF), Utah Department 
of Health. Bernadette McNally and Richard Fairbourn testified on behalf of Primary 
Children's Hospital ("PCMC"). 
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ISSUE 
WAS DHCF CORRECT IN DENYING REIMBURSEMENT TO PCMC FOR A BONE 
MARROW TRANSPLANT FOR LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Sean was admitted to PCMC for preparation for a bone marrow transplant on July 8, 1997, 
and for the transplant itself on July 17, 1997. Sean was discharged from PCMC on September 
19, 1997. 
2. On or about September 19, 1997, Dr. Ted Keyes, a treating physician of Sean's, 
submitted a prior authorization request form on his behalf. 
3. Richard Fairbourn, who worked as a resource counselor for PCMC in July 1997, had 
worked with Sean's family in March 1997 to establish financial eligibility for Medicaid. 
4. On July 9, 1997, the day after Sean was admitted to PCMC, his family had not received a 
medical card for the month of July and one had not yet been issued. 
5. When Mr. Fairbourn routinely checked the State's computer on July 9, 1997, he was 
concerned when it appeared to him that Sean did not have Medicaid eligibility. At that time he 
went to Debbie Lucero, a state eligibility worker at PCMC and asked her why Sean did not 
have Medicaid eligibility. 
6. Mr. Fairbourn asked Debbie Lucero how Sean could have a history of Medicaid eligibility 
and then not show it on the States's eligibility computer on July 9, 1997. 
7. In light of to Ms. Lucero's response that the case was in review status and needed a new 
eligibility application, Mr. Fairbourn asked Sean's mother to complete a new eligibility 
application. When it was completed, Mr. Fairbourn personally took it to Debbie Lucero and 
handed it to her on July 9, 1997. 
9. On July 9, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn. typed the following note into the hospital computer: 
'TEND: NDCD APP with DEB [see Petitioner's Exhibit 3]. 
10. Mr. Fairbourn was not aware that Sean's eligibility status was confirmed later on July 9 
and a letter so stating went out to the client on that date [see Respondent's Exhibit 10-4 ] . 
11. On August 1, 1997, when Mr. Fairbourn was routinely reviewing his accounts, he learned 
for the first time that the State computer showed Medicaid eligibility for Sean for July and 
August. 
2 
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12. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn typed the note into the hospital computer: UCAID 
ELIG FOR D.O.S." so employees at PCMC could have access to that knowledge. 
13. Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairbourn when cases become eligible. Although 
Ms. Lucero knew this case involved a large amount of money, she failed to inform Mr. 
Fairbourn of Sean's eligibility. 
14. The prior authorization request form was signed on September 19, 1997, and received by 
DHCF on 10-29-97 [see Respondent's Exhibit 11]. 
RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. I recommend that denial of reimbursement for Sean Daugaard's bone marrow transplant be 
AFFIRMED because there is nothing in the record to indicate Ms. Lucero had an affirmative 
duty to keep PCMC apprised of new eligibility approvals, although that had been her custom. 
Having known the financial impact of this case, PCMC was not diligent in following through 
with tracking eligibility status. 
2. Based upon the hearing record as a whole, including PCMC's lack of diligence in tracking 
the eligibility and filing the prior authorization request, does not rise to the level of unusual 
circumstances or equitable estoppel. 
REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION 
Petitioner contended that on July 9, 1997, Medicaid eligibility for July had not been 
authorized. 
Petitioner also contended that the pertinent part of the transplant rule R410-10A-4(5), which 
pertains to prior authorization is ambiguous. That section states: 
Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided under 
unusual, emergency circumstances may be given [when all other criteria are 
met]; emphasis added. 
Petitioner contended that with the comma between unusual and emergency circumstances, a 
reasonable reading would be to consider the meaning to be "unusual OR emergency. 
3 
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circumstances." 
Finally the petitioner argued that the state should be estopped from now saying that PCMC 
should have sent in a prior authorization request form. 
Respondent contended that there was never a break in Sean's medical eligibility and that this 
should have been obvious to PCMC. 
Mr. Stewart stated in his opening argument that the State had previously suspended prior 
authorization requirements "when a provider was unaware that a patient was going to be a 
Medicaid recipient, and in doing so DHCF had followed R410-10A-4(5) which allows post 
transplant authorization "under unusual, emergency circumstances" circumstances [Tr. at 15]. 
Mr. Stewart distinguished that situation from the current case because Sean had a history of 
Medicaid eligibility and contended, therefore, that it was unreasonable for PCMC not to make 
more affirmative efforts to learn of Sean's financial eligibility. 
Petitioner contended that the elements of estoppel set forth in Eldredge v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd.. 795 P2d 671 (Ct. App. 1990) were met and PCMC's actions were reasonably 
prudent and diligent in processing the prior authorization request. 
In the Eldredge case, Mr. Eldredge, a county employee, received conflicting information on 
whether he could retire after a certain number of years without having to purchase previous 
years from when he had worked for the county at an earlier time. The Utah Court of appeals 
sets forth the elements of the doctrine of estoppel as follows: 
As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is not assertable against the 
state and its agencies [citations omitted]. Utah courts have, however, carved out an 
exception to this general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain 
that the interests of justice so require [citations omitted]. In cases where such an issue 
arises, the critical inquire is whether it appears that the facts may be found with such 
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the 
exception [citations omitted]. 
The Court of Appeals then set forth in Eldredge the elements: 
The elements essential to invoke inequitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later 
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis 
of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to 
the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act [citations omitted]. 
4 
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Based upon the evidence in the hearing record as a whole, the facts of this case do not meet all 
of the elements of government estoppel or the "unusual circumstances" referred to in Utah 
Administrative Rule R410-10A-4(5). Based upon the fact that PCMC had prior knowledge of 
the patient's Medicaid and did not'follow up on the status of a case with this much of a 
financial impact, it is difficult to determine that PCMC's actions were entirely reasonable or 
that the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
Wherefore, based upon the evidence in the formal hearing record as a whole, the presiding 
officer concludes that DHCF's decision to deny authorization for lack of prior authorization 
for Sean's bone marrow transplant be AFFIRMED. 
lis DATED th *<*_ day of September 1998 
Administrative Law Judge 
5 
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David B. Erickson #3788 
Attorney for Petitioner 
36 South State Street, 22nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 442-3810 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Division of Health Care Financing 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL 
CENTER/ SEAN DAUGAARD, : 
: EXHIBIT ONE 
Petitioner, : Case No. 98-033-47 
vs. : 
: Honorable Margaret J. Clark 
Utah Department of Health Division of : Administrative Law Judge 
Health Care Financing, : 
Respondent. : 
SELECTED MEDICAL RECORDS OF 
SEAN DAUGAARD 
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PRIH4RY CHILDREN'S KEDCl 
M* ~*V 
PROGRESS NOTES <i.W CJU^J-QD 
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DEPARTMENT OF PATHOLOGY 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER 
100 NORTH MEDICAL DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH B4113 
TELEPHONE (801) 688-3167 
PATHOLOGISTS 
CHERYL M, COFFIN, M 4 \ 
AM Y LOWICHIK, */LD> 
THEODORE J . PYSHER. M.D. 
Name: DAUGAARD, S e a n PS 0 7 2 3 - 9 7 
MR Ho: 3 2 - 0 9 - 8 7 DOB: 0 5 / 2 6 / 9 2 Sex: M 
Room No:. Physician: Patr ick Beatty, M.D. 
Date of Surg: 03/31749 Date Rec'd: 03/31/97 
Time Rec'd: Account i: 4 6 7 9 2 9 5 8 
clinical Hx: The pat ient i s a 4-year-o ld boy who 
presents with acute leukemia. 
Operative Findings/Dx: 
CODE: T1 
DIAGNOSIS: PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND ILIAC CREST BONE MARROW ASPIRATE: ACUTE 
LYMPHOBLASTIC LEUKEMIA (T-CELL PHENOTYPE). SEE UUHSC COMMENT. 
GROSS DESCRIPTION: A bone marrow aspirate from the left iliac crest is received from 
Patrick BeattYt M.D. Aspirate smears are prepared and the remainder of the specimen is fixed 
in B5 solution, filtered and submitted for histologic study. Portions of the specimen are sent 
to LDS Row Cytometry Laboratory and University of Utah Cytogenetics Laboratory for workup 
and the reports from those services are attached. Representative peripheral blood smears and 
bone marrow aspirate smears and clot sections have been referred to the Hematopathology 
Service at the University of Utah Health Sciences Center for evaluation. JN/tac 071797 
COMMENT: Attached is the report from Carl R. Kjeldsberg, M.D. of the Hematopathology 
Service, University of Utah Health Sciences Center. CMC/sm 072197 
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HEMAT0PATH0L06Y REPORT 
1 MICROSCOPIC 
• Flow cytoeetric analysis was perforrcd on the bone sarrow aspirate at LDS 
Hospital (FL4J4-97). An abnonal, inature T-cell population representing 
• between 18 to & X of cells in the speciien was identified in the "lyiphoid 
J gate-. These cells have the following inunophenotypc: CD34+f CD2+, CD3* 
!dit), CD5+ (diz). CD7X, ard TdT+ (die subpopulation). This cell populati:n 
cay express yery dii CD33 and possibly CD10. B-csil antigens or other lyeloid 
antigens are not identified on this blast population. The retaining cells 
' show saturing lonocytic and syebid patterns. 
I Cytccheiica! studies were also perfoned on a peripheral blood saiple obtained 
I April 1, 1997. Morphologically, a definitive blast population is lore easily 
identified. These cells show no reactivity with Ryeloperoxidase or 
I nonspecific esterase. Flow cytoietric analysis was also perfoned on the peripheral blood (FLA77-97). An inature T-cell population with an iiiunophenotype siiilar to that identified in the bone tarrow aspirate 
(R.454-97) was identified. By flow, this population represents 13* of cell: 
I in the peripheral blood. A lanual differential count perfoned or. the 
I peripheral blood the sare day showed 16* blasts. JN/ali 
I DIAGNOSIS 
I PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND BONE HARROW - ACUTE LYMPHOBLASTIC LEiMEMIR (T-CELL 
PHENOTYPE). SEE COMt€NT. ' 
04/03/97 
I CCRK/ali) Diagnosis by: Carl R. Kjeldsberg, M.D. 
Verified by: Carl R. Kjeldsberg, M.D. 
j electrcnir signature 
CQKSJTS 
I This is an extreiely difficult case. Morphologically, there is a definitive PLL blast population in the aspirate which corresponds to the CD34*, imt'ire 
T-cell pcpulaticn identified by flow and by TdT positivity on 
iiiur.Dfluoresrer.ce. Additionally, all of the blasts present in the periphe*-?! 
J blood are of T-cell phenotype by flow. The bone narrow also contains a large 
r.uxbe- :f relatively iaiature r/eloid cells. In well stained, uncrewded crD3'. 
I of t*:c scear lest these cells have features of abnerra! proiyelocytes (nuclear 
1 heff, azurophilic granules), tyelocytes and proionocytes. This correlates 
I DAUGAARD, SEAN Continued on next pag?. 
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1340 
2011 
TEST UNIVERSITY 0T UTAH 
UNITS 
Sherrie L. Perkins, N.D., Ph.D., Laboratory Director 
HEMATDPATH0L0GY REPORT 
O W E N T S 
with the lack of a significant CD34* tyeloid blast population by flow. Because 
of the larkedly abnorial tyeloid xaturation and proiinent bone tarrow and 
peripheral blood conocytosis with dysplasia, NSE negative lonocytes, we feel 
the best interpretation of this speciien is acute lysphoblastic leukeoia 
(T-cell phenotype) arising froc a r/elodysplastic/eyeloproHfe^ctive disorder 
such as O W L or juvsr.ile OIL. Correlation with cytcQenctics lay be useful. 
The results of this exaiination were discussed with Dr. Bruggers on 4/1/97. 
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Sherrie L. Perkins. M.D.. Ph.D.. Laboratory Director 
HEMAT0PATH0L0GY REPORT 
MICROSCOPIC 
(FL454-97) was identified. Bv flow, this oooulation reoresents 13* of cells 
in the oerioheral blood. A lanual differential count oerfoned on the 
oerioheral blood the saie dav showed Ik* blasts. JN/ali 
DIAGNOSIS 
PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND BONE HARROW - ACUTE LYMPHOBLASTIC LEUKEMIA (T-CELL 
PHENOTYPE). SEE COMMENT. 
T0X000. T06000. DC0107. MCOO&fc 
04/03/97 
(CRK/alr) Diaonosis bv: Carl R. Kieldsbe^o. M.D. 
Verified bv: Carl R. Kieldsbero. M.D. 
electronic sionature 
colors 
1 
This is an extreielv difficult case. Moroholoaicallv. there is a definitive 
ALL blast oooulation in the asoirate which corresoonds to the CD34+. inature 
T-cell oooulation identified bv flow and bv TdT oositivitv on 
immunofluorescence. Additionallv. all of the blasts oresent in the oerioheral 
blood are of T-cell ohenotvoe bv flow. The bone farrow also contains a laroe 
nutber of relatively inature iveloid cells. In well stained, uncrowded areas 
of the siear lost these cells have features of abnorial oroivelocvtes (nuclear 
hoff. azurophilic aranules). ivelocvtes and oroeonoevtes. This correlates 
with the lack of a sionificant CD34* iveloid blast oooulation bv flow. Because 
of the tarkedlv abnorial tveloid laturation and oroiinent bone larrow and 
oerioheral blood tonoevtosis with dvsolasia. NSE neoative lonocvtes. we feel 
the best interoretation of this soeciien is acute lviohoblastic leukeiia 
(T-cell Dhenotvoe) arisino froi a •velodvsolastic/ivelooroliferative disorder 
such as CMML or iuvenile CML. Correlation with cvtoaenetics iav be useful. 
The results of this examination were discussed with Dr. Bruooers on 4/1/S7. 
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April 24, 1997 
Dick Lemons, MD 
PCMC Hem/One 
Re: Sean Daaguard 
Dear Dick, 
I met with the mother of Sean Daaguard to review the role of bone 
marrow transplant in the treatment of Sean's leukemia. As you know, 
he is now an almost five year old male who initially presented with 
large cervical nodes and high spiking fevers in November 1996. He 
was felt at that time to have an EBV infection and was treated with 
steroids with good response of both his fever and size of his lymph 
nodes. However, once the steroids were stopped he again had an 
increase in his lymph nodes size and began running low grade 
fevers. Because of these recurrent symptoms he was seen by his 
doctor who noted a white count of >60,000, and platelets 53,000. He 
was referred to Hem/One where a bone marrow showed the presence of 
blasts. Flow cytometry showed between 18-26% lymphoblasts. The 
histologic appearance of the bone marrow showed presence of both 
small lymphoblasts and abnormal myeloid cells that appeared to have 
abnormal development/arrest. His cytogenetics were completely 
normal as was his CSF. The diagnosis of Acute Lymphoblastic 
Leukemia with an underlying myelodysplastic picture was made. He 
was started on IDA DCTER on 3/30/97 and received his second dose of 
chemotherapy on 4/8/97. His bone marrow on day 10 has shown 
evidence of good response with only 10% cellularity but 19% 
persistent blasts. His clinical course to date has been complicated 
by infectious disease issues. He has had a positive blood culture 
for strep and in addition his skin lesion was biopsied positive for 
aspergillus. His head, chest, sinus, and abdominal CT show no 
evidence of invasive fungal disease although abdominal CT shows 
evidence of typhlitis, HLA typing of his one full sibling and 
parents show no evidence of a match. We will continue to type his 
half sibling and then evaluate other potential family members for 
typing. 
I discussed in general the issue of proceeding on to transplant. 
0000015 
Bone marrow transplant offers a greater chance of cure than non-
myeloablative chemotherapy. I reviewed briefly the scenario of 
eight weeks of inpatient hospitalization followed by many weeks to 
months of outpatient therapy. We also reviewed briefly the risks of 
the radiation and chemotherapy, those being marrow ablation and 
therefore the risk of life threatening infection, mucositis, 
diarrhea, liver and kidney toxicity, and long term effects with 
radiation of cataracts, thyroid failure and sterility. Sean's 
mother, was fairly overwhelmed by the enormity of Sean's needs at 
this point. We therefore did not go into further detail about the 
mechanics of transplant. She appears to understand the need for 
transplant but is very worried about how to take care of Sean and 
maintain care for herself and the rest of her family. 
My recommendation is that Sean proceed with his non-myeloablative 
chemotherapy. Once his infectious disease issues have been resolved 
and we have seen how his marrow responds to chemotherapy, I would 
recommend that we proceed with a bone marrow transplant. If we can 
identify a family member that is a reasonable match they would 
obviously be the best choice. However, if we cannot identify a 
family member, I would recommend we proceed to an unrelated 
transplant. I will need to speak again with Sean's parents and 
other family members about the details of transplant within the 
next couple of weeks. If you have any questions please don't 
hesitate to call. 
Sincerely, 
Roberta H. Adams, MD 
Director, Pediatric Blood and Marrow Transplant 
cc: Parents 
Marcella Gaughan 
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Dr. Wain Allen 
82 North 50 East 
P.O. Box 730 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Re: Sean Daugaard 
PCMC# 32-09-87 
Dear Dr. Allen: 
I am writing to update you regarding Sean Daugaard, the youngster who 
presented with lymphadenopathy and cytopenias in March of 1997. 1 believe Dr. 
Carroll who was the attending, was in communication with you at that time but I will 
summarize his hospital course now. Briefly, he was admitted to the PICU because of 
concern regarding airway compromise due to his significant adenopathy. Bone marrow 
aspiration was done which was originally felt to be ANLL and he was started on 
chemotherapy consisting of Idarubicin, Ara-C, etoposide, 6-TG and decadron. His CSF 
was negative for evidence of disease. Further evaluation of his marrow revealed that 
the predominant blasts present were actually T-cell lymphoblasts which was felt to 
arise in the pre-existing myelodysplasia. He responded well to this initial 
chemotherapy and vincristine was also added. He began his second cycle of 
chemotherapy on April 8. However, this was discontinued after 2 days because of new 
onset of worrisome skin rash at his wrist. Biopsy of that revealed aspergillus. He was 
started on liposomal amphotericin which he has been on since mid-April. His counts 
recovered, his bone marrow done on 5-1-97 revealed remission and in general he is 
doing well. 
Nutrition issues remain significant and he has recently been weaned off TPN 
and onto NJ feeds. He was treated with chemotherapy consisting of high dose Ara-C 
followed by L-asparaginase this past weekend and tolerated it well. He was discharged 
home on 5-12-97 on NJ feeds as well as daily amphotericin. The amphotericin will be 
administered with a nurse in the house for approximately 6 hours daily. It will be 
continued through the nadir and count recovery following his most recent 
chemotherapy. 
Given the pre-existing myelodysplastic changes in Sean's marrow, we have 
decided to pursue bone marrow transplantation as definitive therapy. Bone marrow 
transplant team has been involved and is currently in the process of typing multiple 
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family members. He does not have a sibling who directly matches but the hope is that 
one of his more distant relatives may. However, I understand that an unrelated bone 
marrow transplant search is ongoing at this time as well. It is our hope that by the time 
his counts recover within 3 weeks he will be able to be admitted to the bone marrow 
transplant unit and being his conditioning therapy. Decisions regarding amphotericin 
therapy at that time will be made when he enters the unit upon ID recommendations. 
There are significant psychosocial concerns with this family. However, we feel 
that with the step-father at home during the night and registered nurse there for the 
majority of the day, Sean should do well for the next few weeks. I understand that his 
grandparents will be involved with transplant and post transplant care. 
I hope this update is regarding Sean is adequate. As I look through his chart, I 
am uncertain whether a letter was dictated prior to this time and I apologize if it was 
not. We will be in close contact with Sean and his mother in the next few months. 
However, if any new problems arise from your standpoint, please do not hesitate to 
contact us. 
Sincerely, 
CO^^/V^Y^ 
Carol Bruggers, M.D. 
Assistant Professor of Pediatrics 
CB:ss 
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'hone 801 783-5363 
lote Originator PCBFAIRB Next note date is: 8/01/97 
issigned to PCBFAIRB 
:vent Date 7/09/97 
lote Date 7/09/97 Note Reviewed (Y/N) 
'age 01 PEND: MDCD APP WITH DEB. BF 
JO UPDATE ALLOWED. INQUIRY ONLY 
additional Notes (Y=Yes N=No)... N Followup Date 0/00/00 
F8 - Copy Note 
EXHIBIT THREE 
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P A T I . ' N T A C C O U N T N O T E S 
HDU615B N O T E S E N T R Y / I N Q U I R Y 7 / 2 0 / 9 8 1 2 : 2 8 : 0 5 
atient... DAUGAARD, SEAN P 103 Account#. . . . 46792958 
uarantor. DAUGAARD, ADAM F Balance.... .00 
hone 801 783-5363 
ote Originator PCBFAIRB Next note date is: 8/04/97 
ssigned to PCBFAIRB 
vent Date 8/01/97 
ote Date 8/01/97 Note Reviewed (Y/N) 
age 01 CAID: ELIG FOR D.O.S. BF 
O UPDATE ALLOWED. INQUIRY ONLY 
dditional Notes (Y=Yes N=No)... N Followup Date . 0/00/00 
F8 - Copy Note 
EXHIBIT FOUR 
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•ATE 
• v Y l - ^ -
C A S E S U M M A R Y 
PERSON7AGENCY SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION/ACTION 
{[L&rtS&vdyj^xA M : ^ o t'*i 
u 
•:-fr-4" 
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gkl 
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ORIGINAL CLAIM HISTORY INQUIRY - INPATIENT UB-82 1/2 6 
TCN: 97275211000021300 CAT-SVC: 01 ,CYCLE: CLERK: 000 LOC: CCP 
AID TYPE: A5 FUND: A CLM-STAT: N DENIED MED-REC-NUM: 384679295 
RECIPIENT-ID': 0302605602 D/E-NAME: DAUGA SEAN NAME: MCCAULEY SEAN 
NB: BTH-DT: 05/26/92 SEX: M AGE: 005 PROV-TYP: .01 PROV-NUM: 942854058 
OTHER-INS: N ESPDT: FAMILY-PLAN: AUTO-ACCID: N OTHER-ACCID: N EMPLOYMENT 
PRIOR-AUTH: P/A IND: REF-LIC#: ATT-PHYS: 87176 
ADMIT-LIC#: ADMIT-DATE: 07/08/97 ADMIT-HOUR: 08 ADMIT-TYPE: 1 
BEGINNING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 07/08/97 ENDING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 09/19/97 
ICD-9-CM 1: 20500 2: 99685 3: 00845 4: 2761 5: 2848 ACCIDENT-DATE: 
SURG-LIC-NUM: 10797 SURG^PRQCzl-: 4103 SURG-PROC-2: 0331 SURG-PROC-3: 413 
SURG-DAfSP:TT-07/l7/97 SURG-DATE-2: 07/08/97 SURG-DATE-3: 07/08 
INELIG-DAYS: 000 OUTLIER-DAYS-APPROVED: 000 
NON-COV-DAYS: 000 COV-DAYS: 073 DATE-DISC: 09/19/97 DATE-DEATH: 
STILL-A-PATIENT: DISCHARGE-STATUS : C CHILD-ABUSE: SIGNATURE-IND: Y 
BILLING-DATE: 10/02/97 BILLING-TYPE: 111 ATTACH-IND: N INS-CO: 
ADJ-RSN: TCN-TO-CREDIT: 00000-000-0000000 
DATE-PAID: 10/03/97 WARRANT-NUM: 00000669344 REIMB-AMT: .00 
STRL-CONSENT-DATE: INTERPRET-DATE: CIRC-IND: 
PAY-TO-PROV: 942854058211 CCF-SENT-DATE: CO-PAYMENT-AMT: 
DRG-CODE: 481 
00 345 5 000 00 342 4 000 00 704 5 000 00 495 3 000 00 596 2 000 
M\D'6 ~- IlXn<?_ i H ' V r r o u J V T P 
Date: 3/30/98 Time: 02:51:33 PM 
8wW 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
• ATTACHMENT INDICATOR 
REQUEST FOR PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 
Form Number 
24 04 37 
Prior Authorization 
Document Number P581120 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
MEDICAL SERVICES FORM 
1. Patient Name. Last. First. M I. 
dAjA-bM) rf&flN 2 Age 
_5L 
3. Sex 
H 
4. Client I 0. Number 
5. Patient Street Address. City, State, Zip Code 
Mar A) uxcoBJZtoe *n £AHX> . urr 8<&/j 
STATE USE ONLY | 
«. Effective Date 
17. Termination Date 
8. Proposed Medical Supplies, Drug, Therapy, or Surgical Procedures 
(Identify Primary Procedure First) 
a. PROCEDURES DC 
OR SURGICAL CODE 10. Units 
11. Estimated 
Cost 
12. STATE USE ONLY ' 
Approved 
Amot{rtt Units 
Yea/ 
Jfe_ 
1 l^^Qt^LfcTT^n ftPHUe= JrWA^gQfli 
niRAO^PUrU 
3 ^\)D A^s^^rifVTFnn K)fttX 
13. Will the services of an. A. Anesthesiologist be used? O Yes 
B Assistant at Surgery be used** D Yes 
14 Can this procedure be done in your office • yes pT.No (** no» CQ"»P*ate items IS through 18 below.) 
15. Hospital or Surgical Center Name and Address 16". STATE USE ONLY 
P&IHAO CMU>£.&3?> HET>. CtrtfEj^ Facility ProvKWf Number 
/CO AJ0£7»- HELICAL OK^ 
5L(L UTftH. SHH3 
17. Estimated 
hospital days 
of stay 
no 
18. ICD-9-CM CODE 19. STATE USE ONLY 
L«£Sr5sa4 Approved 
20. SUMMARY OF HISTORY: (Physical Examination, Laboratory, X-ray studies, prescriptions, and other applicable documentation must be supplied in sufficient 
detail to Justify the necessity for the procedure. If the patient is mentally retarded or under psychtatnc treatment, please so indicate and attach additional documenta-
tion as appropnate.) 
5BEr A T T A C H 
21. Non-Therapeutic Stenlfcation Request, complete "A" through "C" below. Also attach the completed copy No. 1 of Form 499-A (Part II), before mailing to this office. 
* A. Is the above patient in an Institution orVcorrectional facility?- • Yes • No 
* 8 . Is the above patient mentally lit?, j £ - V * V z" D Y « D N O 
* C. Is the above patient merrtailv retarded? * - ' V * ...- - ' : " v / ' O Yea D Mo 
Patfent'a Date 
of Birth: <'C** 
MM DO YY 
4 /_? <*'7 
22. Name and Address of Requesting or Supplying Provider 
' ^ -~v >„ A RAJ6 0 F REQUEST: 
Z>L<L UT SY//3 
] 23. Signature ——> 
24. Requesting 
Provider Number (12 0IG1TS) 
g4-l73J/Sg-l2Q5" 
25. Name and Address of Referring or Prescribing Provider 
26. Refemng or Prescribing 
Provider License Number 
NOTE: This is NOT a certificate of eligibility nor a guarantee of payment amount 
requested. Eligibility must be confirmed by reviewing an eligibility card current for 
the month services are to be performed. 
SOH OHCF PA-3 (9-M) 
- < ^ > / r : ; Y/+J&; A- zi-:S\?Gi^ih*vn S T A T E U S E ONLT - * * *"%& 
!•*. ,tr* 
... A T * ? ? - , I z^M*£ 
"^^* ^T*^?^SIo ju^g^tRey<ewtof l A u j h o d t y ^ ^ A P S E ^ 
rage: ± uuuumenc Name: ^ u±<k / 
0000023 
ACHI 
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D 
ACTION HISTORY 12AUG98 10:09 
ANA G 
CASE NUMBER: 00280190 
ACTION 
DATE 
23JUL97 
09JUL97 
09JUL97 
09JUL97 
09JUL97 
09JUL97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
09JUN97 
ACTION 
TIME 
09:55:25 
12:41:17 
1*2:41:11 
12:37:38 
12:36:29 
12:36:11 
16:03:07 
16:02:51 
13:47:17 
13:46:40 
13:46:20 
13:45:54 
13:45:34 
13:45:29 
SECURITY 
KEY USED 
HLDELU>-CM° 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLML2 
HLML2 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
HLDEL 
ACTION 
TYPE 
ADD 
CHANGE 
UNKNOWN 
CHANGE 
CHANGE 
ADD 
CHANGE 
UNKNOWN 
CHANGE 
CHANGE 
CHANGE 
CHANGE 
ADD 
CHANGE 
SCREEN 
ID 
CAMM 
EWAL 
NORS 
DMM1 
DMM1 
CAMM 
EWAL 
NORS 
DMEX 
DMEX 
EAIN 
EAIN 
CAMM 
DMEX 
DATE--> 
BENEFIT 
MONTH 
AUG97 
JUL97 
JUL97 
JUL97 
JUN97 
MAY97 
MAY97 
JUN97 
JUN97 
MAY97 
PROGRAM 
TYPE 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
BUDGETING 
METHOD 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
NEXT--> 
Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:12:47 AM 
0000024 
trayc : x U U L U U I C U L i^ame : £> . *±** ' 
NOHI NOTICE HISTORY 12AUG98 09:59 
NOTICE NUMBER: MMAA ANA G 
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D CASE NUMBER: 00280190 
PROGRAM: DM BENEFIT MONTH: MAR97 DATE PRINTED: 09JUN97 
FROM: LUCERO, DEBBIE E 
YOUR APPLICATION FOR MEDICAID ASSISTANCE, DATED APRIL 11, 1997, 
WAS APPROVED ON 09 JUN 1996. 
7 
YOUR MEDICAL COVERAGE BEGAN ON MARCH 01, 1997. YOU WILL RECEIVE A 
MEDICAL CARD IN THE MAIL. IT WILL LIST THE NAMES AND I.D. NUMBER OF 
ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WHO RECEIVE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. YOU MUST SHOW 
THIS CARD TO THE DOCTOR, PHARMACY, OR HOSPITAL TO GET MEDICAL 
COVERAGE. 
YOUNG CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL 
FOOD FROM THE WIC PROGRAM. FOR INFORMATION CALL 1-800-662-3638 OR 
CONTACT YOUR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT 
SCREEN 1 OF 2 
Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:03:08 AM 
r*^ 
0 0 0 0 0 2 5 
SVSV« W4.ltIV>J. A V, J.1GUUC 
NOHI NOTICE HISTORY 
NOTICE NUMBER: MMAA 
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D CASE NUMBER: 00280190 
PROGRAM: DM BENEFIT MONTH: MAR97 DATE PRINTED: 09JUN97 
FROM: LUCERO, DEBBIE E 
12AUG98 10:00 
ANA G 
801 588 2651, 
SCREEN 2 OF 2 
Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:03:19 AM 
J^^ ^SSp^^ l m 
0000026 
Page: l Document Name: S.ul47 
NOHS NOTICE HISTORY SUMMARY 
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D 
12AUG98 10:01 
ANA G 
CASE NUMBER: 00280190 
NOTICE BENEFIT DATE 
BR DEL NUM PGM MONTH PRINTED NOTICE TITLE 
GIFF 
XMRV 
GERE 
ALIR 
GICT 
MMAA 
MCIV 
SCIV 
FCMA 
MMPN 
ALBC 
GIFF 
XCRV 
ALIR 
GERE 
DM 
DM 
DM 
PN 
FS 
AF 
PN 
FS 
APR98 
NOV97 
OCT97 
MAR97 
OCT94 
AUG94 
AUG94 
AUG94 
MAY94 
MAY94 
BENEFIT 
05AUG98 
21APR98 
30OCT97 
140CT97 
23JUL97 
09JUN97 
29AUG94 
06JUL94 
06JUL94 
06JUL94 
22AUG94 
23JUN94 
20MAY94 
21MAY94 
07JUN94 
MONTH: 
FREE FORMAT - GENERAL INFORMATION 
CASE CLOSED-INCOMPLETE REVIEW-MEDICAL 
REVIEW COMPLETED 
INCOMPLETE REVIEW 
CASE TRANSFER 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE APPROVED 
CLOSURE - FAILED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION 
CLOSURE - FAILED TO PROVIDE INFO. - S 
CLOSURE - MARRIAGE - F/M 
MEDICAL PRENATAL ASSISTANCE APPROVED 
ALERT - BIRTH OF CHILD 
CASE CLOSED - INCOMPLETE REVIEW 
INCOMPLETE REVIEW 
REVIEW COMPLETED 
MORE NOTICES: NEXT--> 
Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:06:45 AM 
0000027 
rdye: J» uuuumenc wame: £>. u±*k I 
* INFO * TO DISPLAY MORE RECORDS PRESS ENTER 
CAAL CASE ACTION LOG 12AUG98 10:06 
WORKER: ANA G 
CASE NUMBER: 00280190 CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D 
ACTION DATE WORKER NAME DEPT/REG/OFF 
3 0OCT97 ANITA L HALL HCS 
RECEIVED BANK VERIFICATION AND POSTED ASSET AND INCOME INFORMATION 
FOR OCTOBER REVIEW. FOUND ELIGIBLE. AUTH DM FOR NOV AND DEC. 
140CT97 ANITA L HALL HCS 
REVIEW RECEIVED FOR THE CLIENT. IT IS NOT SIGNED, NOR IS THERE VERIF. 
OF ASSET VALUE FOR BANK ACCOUNT. THIS DATE I SENT ALIR TO CLIENT 
09JUL97 DEBBIE E LUCERO HOP 
CLIENT CAME IN NO CARD FOR JULY 97. AUTH JULY 97 CARD CLIENT REPORTED 
SPOUSE NOT WORKING DID NOT REMOVE INCOME DOES NOT EFFECTIVE ELIG. 
09JUN97 DEBBIE E LUCERO HOP 
I HAVE RECD ALL NEEDED TO DO THIS DM. I HAD A HARD TIME GETTING THE INCOM 
FROM THE EMPLOYER HE IS A CONSTRUCTION WORKER AND DOES HIS OWN BOOKS. 
11APR97 DEBBIE E LUCERO HOP 
I HAVE RECD AP HERE AT PCMC GAVE 124 
SEARCH DATE NEXT 
Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:10:21 AM 
000002S 
Page: 1 Document Name: Sc.^147 
* INFO 
MEBH 
* 
CASE NAME: 
BEN 
MTH 
APR98 
MAR98 
FEB98 
JAN98 
DEC97 
NOV97 
OCT97 
SEP97 
AUG97 
JUL97 
JUN97 
MAY97 
APR97 
MAR97 
PGM 
TYP 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
DM 
MORE : PAGES EXIST 
MEDICAL 
DAUGAARD, 
CAT 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
CVG 
GRP 
BENEFIT HISTORY 
JENNIFER 
NAME 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
SEAN 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
D 
MAIL 
DATE 
31MAR98 
27FEB98 
3 0JAN98 
31DEC97 
28NOV97 
310CT97 
30SEP97 
29AUG97 
31JUL97 
10JUL97 
10JUN97 
10JUN97 
10JUN97 
10JUN97 
SCREEN 12AUG98 10:05 
ANA 
CASE NUMBER: 00280190 
EXCESS 
AMOUNT 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
DOC 
STAT 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
PE 
ISS 
RSN 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
IN 
. G 
ISS 
IND SPI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PI 
PROGRAM TYPE: BENEFIT MONTHj NEXT-
Date: 8/12/98 Time*: 10:09:20 AM 
63-46b-16 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
procity, where there had been no proceeding on future review. Archer v. Board of State Lands & 
his application that was sufficiently judicial in Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995). 
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear- Standard of review. 
ing.w Kirk v. Division of Occupational &Profes- The reviewing court applies differing stan-
sional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. dards of review to an agency's legal interpreta-
1991). tions: first, where the Legislature has explicitly 
This section requires that the district court's or implicitly delegated discretion to the agency 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings be to interpret or apply that law, an intermediate 
accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by deference standard of review is applied; second, 
reviewing an informal record; thus, the district where there is no explicit delegation of discre-
court erred in failing to conduct a trial de novo tion and the issues are questions of constitu-
of proceedings of the Department of Public tional law and statutory construction, the court 
Safety relating to suspension of driving privi-
 reviews the agency's decision for correctness, 
leges. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449 Elks Lodges Nos. 719 & 2021 v. Department of 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 R2d 1189 
District court does not have discretion to (Utah 1995). 
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by 
any method other than a trial de novo; this rule Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
guarantees the district court the opportunity to v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
correct any deficiencies that may arise because 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
of the informal nature of administrative pro- State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. 
ceedings and provides an adequate record for App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by 
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
346 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-16 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-
making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demon-
strate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Agency action. 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Exhaustion of remedies. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statute. 
—Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
Whether the industrial commission acted 
contrary to its own rule was governed by Sub-
section (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
The tax commission's failure to detail how 
federal restraints on the use of subsidized prop-
erty should be assessed was not sufficient harm 
to the property owners to justify relief, when 
the only harm the owners alleged was that 
counties performing future assessments on 
subsidized housing would ignore the restraints. 
Alta Pac. Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997). 
Applicability of section. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an agen-
cy's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 R2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
The ground for relief provided by Subsection 
(4)(g) cannot be invoked to mount a facial 
challenge to an interpretive guideline used by 
an agency in its decision-making process. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993). 
Arbitrary action. 
Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Conflicting evidence. 
In undertaking a review, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review. 
It is the province of the board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appellate court refers to the assessment by 
347 
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26-18-1 HEALTH CODE 
Section 
26-18-8. 
26-18-9. 
26-18-10. 
26-18-11. 
Enforcement of public assis-
tance statutes — Contract 
with Office of Recovery Ser-
vices. 
Prohibited acts of state or local 
employees of Medicaid pro-
gram — "Violation a misde-
meanor. 
Utah Medical Assistance Pro-
gram — Policies and stan-
dards. 
Rural hospitals. 
Part 2 
Drug Utilization Review Board 
26-18-101. Definitions. 
26-18-102. DUR Board — Creation and 
membership — Expenses. 
26-18-103. DUR Board — Responsibilities. 
26-18-104. Confidentiality of records. 
26-18-105. Drug prior approval program. 
Section 
26-18-106. 
26-18-107. 
26-18-108. 
26-18-109. 
Advisory committees. 
Retrospective and prospective 
DUR. 
Penalties. 
Immunity. 
Part 3 
Access to Health Care 
26-18-301. Definitions. 
26-18-302. Department to award grants — 
Applications. 
26-18-303. Content of applications. 
26-18-304. Process and criteria for award-
ing grants. 
26-18-305. Report on implementation. 
Part 4 
Medicaid Waiver 
26-18-401. Medicaid waiver. 
26-18-402. Medicaid Restricted Account. 
PARTI 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
26-18-1. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L. use of confidential information in research. 
1981, ch. 126, § 17. Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted by 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws § 17 of the act. For present provisions relating 
1981, ch. 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1 to confidential information, see Chapter 25 of 
to 26-18-4 (L. 1963, ch. 38, §§ 1 to 4; 1969, ch. this title. 
197, §§ 64, 65; 1971, ch. 53, § 1), relating to 
26-18-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the 
medical programs of the state. 
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the 
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1. 
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be 
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance 
for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant to Title 
XK of the federal Social Security Act. 
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or pay-
ments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance 
under state medical programs. 
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(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital 
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program established under Section 26-18-10. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L. Social Security Act, cited in Subsection (4), is 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1. compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
26-18-2.1. Division — Creation. 
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care 
Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and 
maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program 
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter and applicable federal law. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 21, § 2. 
26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities. 
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of the 
department. The director of the division may employ other employees as 
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall: 
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this 
chapter; 
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and 
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in 
compliance with federal law and regulations. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 21, § 3. 
26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Peri-
odic assessment. 
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economi-
cal manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to 
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, 
excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that fail 
to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity or 
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to 
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with 
regard to both publicly and privately provided services. 
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods, 
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to: 
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utili-
zation is reasonable and necessary; 
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions; 
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(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropriate 
cases; 
(d) second surgical opinions; 
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services; 
(f) coordination of benefits; and 
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who 
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures and 
provisions of federal law and regulation. 
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effective-
ness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider 
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services 
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreason-
able utilization. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L. Social Security Act, cited in Subsection (1), is 
1988, ch. 21, § 4. compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. 
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of division. 
Resource preservation. 
Discretion of division. 
The legislature has, by virtue of Subsection 
(1), explicitly granted the Division of Health 
Care Financing (DHCF) discretion to establish 
criteria concerning medical reimbursement. 
When a hospital failed to submit a physician 
certification before admission of a Medicaid-
eligible patient and never obtained physician 
recertification at any time during the patient's 
three-month stay in acute care, the DHCF 
reasonably denied reimbursement to the hospi-
tal. South Davis Community Hosp. v. Depart-
ment of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by depart-
ment — Disciplinary measures and sanctions — 
Funds collected. 
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the 
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act. 
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with 
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations. 
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of 
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the 
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the 
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of 
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent 
permitted by law and quality control services. 
Resource preservation. 
Utah does not have a "resource spend down" 
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any state-
ment of policy expressing a desire to preserve 
the resources of potential beneficiaries. Utah's 
statutes seem to evince a legislative concern for 
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid pro-
gram, not the preservation of applicants'assets. 
Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 829 P.2d 122 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), afTd, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah 
1993). 
It is not unreasonable for the division to 
apply a fixed asset limit forbidding persons to 
adjust their assets to become eligible for Med-
icaid benefits. Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 
850 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1993). 
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Note 32 
habilitation GrouD. Inc. v. Saboi, N.D.N.Y.1993, 
841 F.Supp. 58. 
Undocumented alien whose chronic alcoholism 
had so compromised her liver and central ner-
vous system before she appeared at hospital 
that lack of immediate medical attention would 
not have resulted in more serious jeopardy to 
her health did not possess "emergency medical 
condition," such that would be eligible for assis-
tance under Medical Care and Assistance Pro-
gram. Norwood Hosp. v. Commissioner of Pub-
lic Welfare, Mass.1994, 627 N.E.2d 914, 417 
Mass. 54. 
Statute which states that Medicaid payment 
shall be made for care and services'to alien 
who is not lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, only if such care and services are 
necessary for treatment of emergency medical 
condition and alien otherwise meets eligibility 
requirements for medical assistance of a State 
plan, is exception to rule that prohibits Medic-
aid not only to nonresident aliens, but also to 
resident aliens whose residency is unlawful; it 
does not affect status of nonresident aliens. 
Salem Hosp. v. Commissioner of Public Wel-
fare, Mass.1991, 574 N.E.2d 385, 410 Mass. 
625. 
33. Relief from judgment or order • 
State of New York was entitled to relief from 
consent decree establishing Medicaid pharmacy 
reimbursement methodology, where Secretary 
of Health and Human Services had subsequently 
established reimbursement cap on Medicaid re-
imbursements for certain defined medications, 
creating risk that state would lose federal finan-
cial participation if it did not comply. Pharma-
PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
ceutical Soc. of the State of New York, Inc. v. 
Cuomo, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 FJ3upp. 826, affirmed 
in part, reversed in part 981 F2d 632. 
34. Similarly situated individuals—General-
ly 
Under federal Medicaid statute pursuant to 
which federal payment for organ transplant will 
not be made unless state plan provides for writ-
ten standards and such standards provide that 
similarly situated individuals are treated alike, 
"similarly situated" means all patients who can 
be treated effectively by same organ transplant 
procedure. Salgado v. Kirschner, Ariz.1994,878 
P.2d 659, 179 Ariz. 301, certiorari denied 115 
S.Ct. 1102, 513 U.S. 1151, 130 L.Ed^d 1069. 
35. Other necessary services 
Provision of state Medicaid plan that allowed 
state to deny life-sustaining liver transplant cov-
erage to otherwise eligible Medicaid recipient 
solely because she was over 21 years of age 
violated requirement of federal Medicaid statute 
that state standards for organ transplants treat 
similarly situated individuals alike; recipient 
was within class of all patients who could be 
treated effectively by liver transplant, and catch-
all provision of Medicaid statute dealing with 
federal early and periodic health screening diag-
nostic and treatment services (EPSDT) did not, 
as state apparently contended, define substan-
tive scope of medically necessary procedures 
and draw distinction for such procedures be-
tween children and adults. Salgado v. Kir-
schner, Ariz.1994, 878 P.2d 659, 179 Ariz. 301, 
certiorari denied 115 S.Ct 1102, 513 U.S. 1151, 
130 L.Ed.2d 1069. 
§ 1396c. Operation of State plans 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
9. Hearing 
Decision of Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) as to whether to hold hearing on 
compliance with federal Medicaid requirements 
is discretionary. Phoenix Baptist Hosp. and 
Medical Center, Inc. v. U.S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1991, 
937 F.2d 452. 
§ 1396& Definitions 
For purposes of this subchapter— 
(a) Medical assistance 
The term "medical assistance" means payment of part or all of the cost of the 
following care and services (if provided in or after the third month before the month in 
which the recipient makes application for assistance or, in the case of medicare cost-
sharing with respect to a qualified medicare beneficiary described in subsection (p)(l) of 
this section, if provided after the month in which the individual becomes such a 
beneficiary) for individuals, and, with respect to physicians' or dentists' services, at the 
option of the State, to individuals (other than individuals with respect to whom there is 
being paid, or who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a medical 
institution, to have paid with respect to them a State supplementary payment and are 
eligible for medical assistance equal in amount, duration, and scope to the medical 
assistance made available to individuals described in section 1396a(a)(10)(A) of this title) 
not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, 
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, and with respect to whom supplemental 
security income benefits are not being paid under subchapter XVI of this chapter, who 
are— 
(i) under the age of 21, or, at the option of the State, under the age of 20,19, or 
18 as the State may choose, 
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(ii) relatives specified in section 606(b)(1) of this title with whom a child is living 
if such child is (or would, if needy, be) a dependent child under part A of subchapter 
IV of this chapter, 
(iii) 65 years of age or older, 
(iv) blind, with respect to States eligible to participate in the State plan program 
established under subchapter XVI of this chapter, 
(v) 18 years of age or older and permanently and totally disabled, with respect to 
States eligible to participate in the State plan program established under subchap-
ter XVI of this chapter, 
(vi) persons essential (as described in the second sentence of this subsection) to 
individuals receiving aid or assistance under State plans approved under subchapter 
I„X, XIV, or XVI of this chapter, 
(vii) blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title, with respect to 
States not eligible to participate in the State plan program established under 
subchapter XVI of this chapter, 
(viii) pregnant women, 
(ix) individuals provided extended benefits under section 1396r-6 of this title, 
(x) individuals described m section 1396a(u)(l) of this title, or 
(xi) individuals described in section 1396a(z)(l) of this title, 
but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost— 
(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for mental 
diseases); 
(2) (A) outpatient hospital services, (B) consistent with State law permitting such 
services, rural health clinic services (as defined in subsection (I )(1) of this section) 
and any other ambulatory services which are offered by a rural health clinic (as 
defined in subsection (l)(l) of this section) and which are otherwise included in the 
plan, and (C) Federally-qualified health center services (as defined in subsection 
(Z )(2) of this section) and any other ambulatory services offered by a Federally-
qualified health center and which are otherwise included in the plan; 
(3) other laboratory and X-ray services; 
(4) (A) nursing facility services (other than services in an institution for mental 
diseases) for individuals 21 years of age or older; (B) early and periodic screening, 
diagnostic, and treatment services (as defined in subsection (r) of this section) for 
individuals who are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21; and (C) 
family planning services and supplies furnished (directly or under arrangements 
with others) to individuals of child-bearing age (including minors who can be 
considered to be sexually active) who are eligible under the State plan and who 
desire such services and supplies; 
(5) (A) physicians' services furnished by a physician (as defined in section 
1395x(r)(l) of this title), whether furnished in the office, the patient's home, a 
hospital, or a nursing facility, or elsewhere, and (B) medical and surgical services 
furnished by a dentist (described in section 1395x(r)(2) of this title) to the extent 
such services may be performed under State law either by a doctor of medicine or 
by a doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine and would be described in clause 
(A) if furnished by a physician (as defined in section 1395x(r)(l) of this title); 
(6) medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law, 
furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by 
State law; 
(7) home health care services; 
(8) private duty nursing services; 
(9) clinic services furnished by or under the direction of a physician, without 
regard to whether the clinic itself is administered by a physician, including such 
services furnished outside the clinic by clinic personnel to an eligible individual who 
does not reside in a permanent dwelling or does not have a fixed home or mailing 
address; 
(10) dental services; 
(11) physical therapy and related services; 
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(B) Coinsurance under subchapter XVIII of this chapter (including coinsurance 
described in section 1395e of this title). 
(C) Deductibles established under subchapter XVIII of this chapter (including 
those described in section 1395e and section 1395Kb) of this title). 
(D) The difference between the amount that is paid under section 1395Z(a) of this 
title and the amount that would be paid under such section if any reference to "80 
percent" therein were deemed a reference to "100 percent". 
Such term also may include, at the option of a State, premiums for enrollment of a 
qualified medicare beneficiary with an eligible organization under section 1395mm of this 
title. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, in the case of a State 
(other than the 50 States and the District of Columbia)— 
(A) the requirement stated in section 1396a(a)(10)(E) of this title shall be 
optional, and 
(B) for purposes of paragraph (2), the State may substitute for the percent 
provided under subparagraph (B) or 1396a(a)(10)(E)(iii)2 of such paragraph any 
percent. 
In the case of any State which is providing medical assistance to its residents under a 
waiver granted under section 1315 of this title, the Secretary shall require the State to 
meet the requirement of section 1396a(a)(10)(E) of this title in the same manner as the 
State would be required to meet such requirement if the State had in effect a plan 
approved under this subchapter. 
(q) Qualified severely impaired individual 
The term "qualified severely impaired individual" means an individual under age 65— 
(1) who for the month preceding the first month to which this subsection applies 
to such individual— 
(A) received (i) a payment of supplemental security income benefits under 
section 1382(b) of this title on the basis of blindness or disability, (ii) a 
supplementary payment under section 1382e of this title or under section 212 of 
Public Law 93-66 on such basis, (iii) a payment of monthly benefits under 
section 1382h(a) of this title, or (iv) a supplementary payment under section 
1382e(c)(3) of this title, and 
(B) was eligible for medical assistance under the State plan approved under 
this subchapter; and 
(2) with respect to whom the Commissioner of Social Security determines that— 
(A) the individual continues to be blind or continues to have the disabling 
physical or mental impairment on the basis of which he was found to be under 
a disability and, except for his earnings, continues to meet all non-disability-
related requirements for eligibility for benefits under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter, 
(B) the income of such individual would not, except for his earnings, be 
equal to or in excess of the amount which would cause him to be ineligible for 
payments under section 1382(b) of this title (if he were otherwise eligible for 
such payments), 
(C) the lack of eligibility for benefits under this subchapter would seriously 
inhibit his ability to continue or obtain employment, and 
(D) the individual's earnings are not sufficient to allow him to provide for 
himself a reasonable equivalent of the benefits under subchapter XVI of this 
chapter (including any federally administered State supplementary payments), 
this subchapter, and publicly funded attendant care services (including personal 
care assistance) that would be" available to him in the absence of such earnings. 
In the case of an individual who is eligible for medical assistance pursuant to section 
1382h(b) of this title in June, 1987, the individual shall be a qualified severely impaired 
individual for so long as such individual meets the requirements of paragraph (2). 
(r) Early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services 
The term "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" means the 
following items and services: 
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(1) Screening services— 
(A) which are provided— 
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical and dental 
practice, as determined by the State after consultation with recognized 
medical and dental organizations involved in child health care and, with 
respect to immunizations under subparagraph (B)(iii), in accordance with 
the schedule referred to in section 1396s(c)(2)(B)(i) of this title for pediatric 
vaccines, and 
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to deter-
mine the existence of certain physical or mental illnesses or conditions; 
and 
(B) which shall at a minimum include— 
(i) a comprehensive health and developmental history (including assess-
ment of both physical and mental health development), 
(ii) a comprehensive unclothed physical exam, 
(iii) appropriate immunizations (according to the schedule referred to in 
section 1396s(c)(2)(B)(i) of this title for pediatric vaccines) according to age 
and health history, 
(iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment appropriate 
for age and risk factors), and 
(v) health education (including anticipatory guidance). 
(2) Vision services— 
(A) which are provided— 
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical practice, as 
determined by the State after consultation with recognized medical organi-
zations involved in child health care, and 
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to deter-
mine the existence of a suspected illness or condition; and 
(B) which shall at a minimum include diagnosis and treatment for defects in 
vision, including eyeglasses. 
(3) Dental services— 
(A) which are provided— 
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of dental practice, as 
determined by the State after consultation with recognized dental organi-
zations involved in child health care, and 
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to deter-
mine the existence of a suspected illness or condition; and 
(B) which shall at a minimum include relief of pain and infections, restora-
tion of teeth, and maintenance of dental health. 
(4) Hearing services— 
(A) which are provided— 
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical practice, as 
determined by the State after consultation with recognized medical organi-
zations involved in child health care, and 
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to deter-
mine the existence of a suspected illness or condition; and 
(B) which shall at a minimum include diagnosis and treatment for defects in 
hearing, including hearing aids. 
(5) Such other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other 
measures described in subsection (a) of this section to correct or ameliorate defects 
and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening 
services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan. 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as limiting providers of early and periodic 
screening, diagnostic, and treatment services to providers who are qualified to provide 
all of the items and services described in the previous sentence or as preventing a 
provider that is qualified under the plan to furnish one or more (but not all) of such 
items or services from being qualified to provide such items and services as part of early 
and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services. The Secretary shall, not 
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Utah Admin. R. 410-14 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
HEALTH 
R410. HEALTH CARE FINANCING. 
Current through December 1, 1998 
R410-14. Division of Health Care Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP 
Applicants, Recipients and Providers, and Non-Medicaid/UMAP Nursing Home Residents as per "OBRA" 
Preadmission Screening and Annual Resident Review (PASARR) Determinations/Resident Rights Requirements. 
R410-14-1. Policy Statement. 
(1) It is the policy of the Division of Health Care Financing to resolve disputes at the lowest level. The following 
rules are not meant to foreclose the Division's preference for informal resolutions through open discussion and 
negotiation between the Division, and applicants, recipients and providers, and all other statutorily/regulatorily 
interested parties. 
R410-14-2. Administrative Hearing Procedures Provide. 
(1) HEARING PROVISION. 
(a) Hearing Responsibility. 
(i) Classification of Hearing. 
(A) Formal Hearings. In accordance with Section 1902(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 431, Subpart E, Sections 26-1-4.1 and 26-23-2, and 63-46b-l, et seq., all Title XIX 
(Medicaid)/Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) recipients or providers (and applicants under certain 
circumstances) aggrieved by any action or inaction of the Department of Health (DOH), Division of Health Care 
Financing (DHCF), will be given an opportunity for a hearing upon written request. All hearings before the 
Division of Health Care Financing except as otherwise set forth shall be conducted as a formal hearing. 
(B) PASARR Hearings. As provided by Section 4211 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 
(OBRA), which amended Title XIX of the Social Security Act by adding Section 1919 to the "Act," all residents 
and potential residents of a nursing facility (whether Medicaid eligible or otherwise) who disagree with the pre-
admission screening and appropriateness of placement decision made by the Division of Health Care Financing, 
shall be given an opportunity for a hearing upon written request. All such PASARR hearings as set forth above 
shall be conducted as a formal hearing. 
(C) Nurse Aide Registry Hearings. As provided by Section 4211 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1987 (OBRA), which amended Title XIX of the Social Security Act by adding Section 1919 to the "Act," all 
nurse aides employed by a certified nursing facility who have successfully completed and passed the nurse aide 
training and competency evaluation program, or both, shall be identified on a nurse aide registry. In addition, 
such nurse aides shall be subject to investigation upon allegations of resident abuse, neglect, or misappropriation 
of resident property. The Division of Health Care Financing or its designated agents shall be responsible for 
investigating such complaints. Before a substantiated claim can be entered into the registry, the nurse aide, upon 
written request, shall be entitled to a hearing to be conducted by the Division of Health Care Financing or its 
designated agents. All such nurse aide registry hearings as set forth above shall be conducted as a formal hearing. 
(D) Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF), Intermediate Care Facility (ICF) or Intermediate Care Facility/Mentally 
Retarded (ICF/MR) Hearings. As provided by 42 CFR 431, Subpart D the Division of Health Care Financing 
must, for any SNF, ICF and ICF/MR, provide for appeals procedures that, as a minimum, satisfy the 
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requirements of 42 CFR 431.153 through 431.155. Such hearings shall be conducted as a formal hearing in 
accordance with R410-14- 2(l)(a)(i)(A). 
(E) Informal Hearings. "Residents' Rights Hearings." As provided by Section 4211 of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA), which amended Title XIX of the Social Security Act by adding Section 1919 
to said "Act," all residents of a nursing facility (whether Medicaid eligible or otherwise) have been granted certain 
specific "residents' rights" and may be aggrieved by action or inaction of a nursing facility in the meeting of those 
rights. Responsibility for enforcing nursing home compliance with the residents' rights requirement rests with the 
Division of Health Care Financing. All "resident rights" hearings shall be conducted as an informal hearing. 
(ii) A hearing is not required and will not be granted to an applicant, recipient or provider if the sole issue is a 
federal or state law or policy requiring an automatic change in covered services adversely affecting some or all 
applicants, recipients or providers (42 CFR 431.220). 
(b) Applicability. 
(i) EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED HEREIN, THESE PROVISIONS ONLY APPLY TO TITLE XIX MEDICAID/ 
UMAP RECIPIENTS OR PROVIDERS. These rules do not apply to initial applications for medical assistance. A 
Medicaid/UMAP applicant who has been denied eligibility for medical assistance through the local Office of 
Community Operations (OCO), Assistance Payments Administration (APA), Department of Social Services 
(DSS), must submit a written request for an eligibility determination hearing to: The Department of Social 
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings, P. O. Box 45500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 or the applicant 
may deliver the written request in person to the local OCO. 
(c) Eligibility Hearing for both Non-Medical Assistance AND Medical Assistance. 
(i) If eligibility for a non-medical assistance program in addition to Medicaid/UMAP is at issue, the Medicaid/ 
UMAP eligibility determination hearing shall be conducted by the Department of Social Services through the 
Office of Administrative Hearings. Requests for such hearings shall be sent to the address in R410-14-2(l)(b)(i). 
All such hearings shall be conducted according to DSS hearing rules. DSS shall propose a recommended decision 
concerning the medical assistance issue only and shall submit it to the Executive Director of DOH or his 
designated representative for agency review. Thereafter the recommended decision shall be handled in accordance 
with Sections 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-15. 
(d) Eligibility Hearing For Medical Assistance Only. 
(i) All requests for hearings to consider eligibility as to medical assistance only, shall be forwarded by DSS to 
DHCF. A formal hearing in accordance with the hearing procedures herein shall be conducted by DHCF. 
(e) Definitions. 
(i) The definitions of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq., as set forth in 
Section 63-46b-2 apply to this rule. 
(ii) "Action" means a denial of Medicaid/UMAP eligibility as regards an applicant; denial, termination, 
suspension, or reduction of Medicaid/UMAP covered services in the case of recipients; or, a reduction or denial 
of reimbursement for such services, findings of licensing survey deficiencies requiring a Plan of Correction, 
failure of DHCF to accept a Plan of Correction required by licensing, or other sanctions as set forth in "DHCF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES", R414-22, in the case of providers. 
(iii) "Aggrieved Person" means any applicant, recipient or provider aggrieved by any action or inaction of 
DHCF. 
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(iv) "Date of Action" means the date on which a denial of eligibility for, termination, suspension or reduction of 
Medicaid/UMAP covered services becomes effective, in the case of applicants or recipients; or, in the case of 
providers the date on which: 
(A) A reduction or denial or reimbursement or sanction becomes effective; 
(B) Notice is given of licensing survey deficiencies; or 
(C) Notice is given that DHCF will not accept a plan of correction of survey deficiencies required by licensing. 
(v) "Division Director" means the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing of the Utah Department of 
Health or his designated and authorized representative. 
(vi) "Executive Director" means the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health or his designated and 
authorized representative. 
(vii) "Formal Hearing" means a hearing before a hearing officer, conducted in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46b. 
(viii) "Informal Hearing" means a hearing before a hearing officer, conducted in accordance with Sections 
63-46b-5, and Section 63-46b-ll through 63-46b-15. Except as by implication and context, no further specific 
procedural or appellate references regarding an "Informal Hearing" shall be had in this present rule, as Sections 
63-46b-5, and Section 63-46b-ll through 63-46b-15 are to be controlling, except specifically R410-14-2(l)(e)(xi), 
below, as to the definition of "Request for an Informal Hearing". 
(ix) "Notice" means a written statement of the action DHCF intends to take, the reasons for the intended action, 
the specific regulations that support (or the change in federal or state law that requires) the action, the right to a 
hearing when applicable, the procedure to obtain a hearing, and an explanation of the circumstances under which 
Medicaid/UMAP benefits or reimbursement will be continued if a hearing is requested. 
(x) "Request for a Formal Hearing" means a clear expression in writing which meets the criteria of a "Request 
for Agency Action" as set forth by Section 63-46b-3 by an aggrieved person or authorized representative. 
(xi) "Request for an Informal Hearing" means a clear expression in writing which meets the criteria of a 
"Request for Agency Action" as set forth by Section 63-46b-3 by an aggrieved person or authorized 
representative. 
(f) Notice. 
(i) When Notice Required. 
(A) Each individual who is affected by an adverse action taken by DHCF will be given advance notice of such 
action in accordance with R410-14- 2(l)(f)(iii). 
(ii) A notice under this section must contain: 
(A) a statement of the action DHCF intends to take; 
(B) the date the intended action takes effect; 
(C) the reasons for the intended action; 
(D) the specific regulations that support, or the change in federal or state law or policy, that requires the action; 
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(E) the aggrieved person's right to request a formal hearing before DHCF, when applicable, and the method by 
which such hearing may be obtained from DHCF; 
(F) a statement that the aggrieved person may represent himself or use legal counsel, relative, friend or other 
spokesman at the formal hearing; and, 
(G) an explanation of the circumstances under which Medicaid/UMAP coverage or reimbursement will be 
continued if a formal hearing is timely requested. 
(iii) DHCF will mail an advance notice at least ten calendar days before the date of the intended action EXCEPT 
as noted below: 
(A) DHCF may mail a notice not later than the date of action if: 
DHCF has factual information confirming the death of a recipient/provider; 
DHCF receives a clear written statement signed by a recipient/provider that: 
he no longer wishes services or reimbursement, or 
gives information that requires termination or reduction of services or reimbursement and indicates that he 
understands that this must be the result of supplying that information; 
the recipient has been admitted to an institution where he is ineligible under the State Plan for further services; 
the recipient/provider's whereabouts are unknown and the Post Office returns DHCF mail directed to him 
indicating no forwarding address; 
DHCF establishes the fact that the recipient has been accepted for Medicaid/UMAP services by another local 
jurisdiction, State, Territory or Commonwealth; 
a change in the level of medical care is prescribed by the recipient's physician; or 
a termination, suspension or reduction of Medicaid/UMAP covered services or reimbursement is necessitated by 
an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare. 
(B) DHCF may shorten the period of advance mailed notice to five days before the date of action if: 
DHCF has facts indicating that action should be taken because of probable fraud by the applicant/recipient/ 
provider; and 
the facts have been verified, by affidavit, if possible. 
(g) Request for Formal Hearing and Agency Response. 
(i) Formal hearings are held for "medical assistance only" issues. If an aggrieved person's request for an 
eligibility hearing concerns both non- medical assistance and medical assistance, he should refer to R410-14-
2(l)(c)(i), above. An aggrieved person may request a formal hearing within the following deadlines, depending 
upon the type of request: 
(A) An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid provider may request a formal hearing within 30 calendar days from the 
date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or inaction. 
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
0 0 0 0 0 4 2 
UT ADC R410-14 Page 45 
(B) An aggrieved Medicaid applicant or recipient may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility for "medical 
assistance only" within 90 calendar days from the date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by 
DHCF of an action or intended action. 
(C) An aggrieved UMAP applicant or recipient may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility within 90 
calendar days from the date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or 
intended action. 
(D) An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid applicant or recipient may request a formal hearing regarding scope of 
service within 30 calendar days from the date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of 
an action or intended action. 
(ii) Failure to submit a timely request for a formal hearing will constitute a waiver of a person's formal hearing 
or pre-hearing rights. A request for a hearing shall be in writing, shall be dated, and shall explain the reasons for 
which the hearing is requested. An aggrieved person may use the hearing request form which is attached to all 
negative eligibility action notices, or the form which is provided in Attachment "A," which is entitled "Requests 
for Hearing/Agency Action." DHCF will provide copies of the form in Attachment A to all interested persons. 
(iii) The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/Agency Action" for: (a) Medicaid or UMAP providers; 
and (b) Medicaid or UMAP scope of service hearings is as follows: 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Attention: Formal Hearings 
P.O. Box 16580 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580 
(iv) The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/Agency Action for Medicaid and UMAP applicants 
regarding eligibility issues is: 
The Department of Social Services 
Office of Administrative Hearings 
P.O. Box 45500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 
(v) Requests for formal hearing will be docketed and scheduled within 30 calendar days. DHCF as respondent 
shall schedule a hearing or begin negotiations in the matter in writing within 30 days of the date of issuance of the 
request for formal hearing or agency action. 
(h) DOH or DHCF may deny or dismiss a request for a formal hearing if: 
(i) The aggrieved person withdraws the request in writing; 
(ii) The aggrieved person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing without good cause; or 
(iii) The provider fails to allow DHCF access to its records pursuant to R410-14-3. 
(iv) Reinstatement/Continuation of Services. 
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(A) DHCF may reinstate services for recipients or suspend any adverse action for providers as defined in 
R410-14-2(l)(e)(ii) if an aggrieved person requests a formal hearing not more than ten calendar days after the date 
of action. 
(B) DHCF must reinstate or continue services for recipients or suspend adverse actions for providers until a 
decision is rendered after a formal hearing if: 
adverse action is taken without giving the ten day advanced mailed notice to a recipient/provider in all 
circumstances where such advance notice is required; 
in those circumstances where advance notice is not required, as set forth in R410-14-2(l)(f)(iii)(A), the 
aggrieved person requests a formal hearing within ten calendar days following the date the adverse action notice is 
mailed; or 
DHCF determines that the action resulted from other than the application of federal or state law or policy. 
(C) DHCF may proceed with its intended action if: the aggrieved person withdraws his request for either a 
formal hearing in writing; or, the aggrieved person prolongs the hearing process without good cause; or, a 
recipient's whereabouts are unknown, as indicated by the return of agency mail directed to him which is not 
forwardable. 
(j) Formal Hearing 
(i) A request for a formal hearing must be made to the Division of Health Care Financing, 288 North 1460 
West, P. O. Box 16580, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580, Attention: "Formal Hearings/ 
(ii) Notice of Formal Hearing. 
(A) DHCF shall notify the aggrieved person or his attorney, in writing, of the date, time and place of the 
hearing. Notice shall be mailed not less than ten calendar days before the scheduled date of the formal hearing. 
(iii) Form of Papers. All papers to be filed in a formal hearing shall: 
(A) Be typewritten or legibly hand-written; 
(B) Bear a caption clearly showing the title of the hearing; 
(C) Bear the docket number, if any; 
(D) Be dated and signed by the party or his authorized representative and shall contain his address and telephone 
number; and 
(E) Consist of an original and two copies filed with DHCF. 
(iv) Hearings may be delayed until the requirements of this section are met. 
(v) Service. 
(A) The party filing papers and documents shall serve them upon all parties to the formal hearing. Proof of 
service shall be filed with DHCF. 
(B) Service shall be personally delivered or by mail, properly addressed with postage prepaid, one copy to each 
party entitled thereto. When a party is represented by an attorney, service upon the attorney shall be determined as 
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
UT ADC R410-14 Page 47 
sufficient service upon the party or parties. 
(C) Proof of service shall be by certificate, affidavit or acknowledgment. 
(D) Wherever notice by DHCF is required, notification shall be effective upon the date of first class mailing to a 
party's residence or business address. 
(E) In addition to the methods set forth in these rules, a party may be served in any manner permitted by law. 
(vi) As permitted by Section 63-46b-10, intervention will be permitted provided the following requirements are 
met: 
(A) Persons desiring to intervene in a formal hearing must petition for leave to intervene at least seven days 
before the scheduled hearing, unless otherwise permitted by the hearing officer. 
(B) The petition must contain a clear and concise statement of the direct and substantial interest of the person 
seeking leave to intervene in the hearing. 
(C) Persons seeking affirmative relief shall state the basis of such relief. 
(D) Other parties to the hearing must have an opportunity to support or oppose intervention. 
(E) The hearing officer may grant leave to intervene subject to such reasonable conditions as he may prescribe. 
An intervenor may be dismissed from the hearing if it appears that he has no direct or substantial interest in the 
hearing. 
(vii) Conduct of Hearing. 
(A) Formal hearings shall be conducted by an impartial hearing officer who is appointed by DOH. The hearing 
officer shall be empowered with such authority as granted by Section 63-46b-l, et seq., except as may be limited 
by these rules. No hearing officer shall have been directly involved in the initial determination of the action in 
question. 
(B) All formal hearings shall be conducted only after adequate written notice of the hearing has been served on 
all parties setting forth the time, date and place of the hearing. 
(C) Testimony shall be taken under oath or affirmation administered by the hearing officer. 
(D) Each party shall have the right to: call and examine parties and witnesses; introduce exhibits; question 
opposing witnesses and parties on any matter relevant to the issue even though the matter was not covered in the 
direct examination; impeach any witness regardless of which party first called him to testify; and rebut the 
evidence against him. 
(E) The rules of evidence as applied in civil actions in the courts of this state shall be generally followed in the 
hearings. Any relevant evidence may be admitted. Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of 
supplementing or explaining other evidence, but shall not be sufficient by itself to support a finding unless it 
would be admissible over objection in civil actions. The hearing officer shall give effect to the rules of privilege 
recognized by law. Irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. 
(F) The hearing officer may order the taking of interrogatories and depositions and assess the expense to the 
requesting party if the hearing officer determined such to be proper. 
(G) The hearing officer may question any party or witness and may admit any evidence he believes is relevant or 
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material. 
(H) The hearing officer shall control the taking of evidence in a manner best determined to be best suited to 
ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights of the parties. The hearing officer shall explain the issues and the order 
in which evidence will be received. 
(I) A party has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence whatever facts it must establish to 
sustain its position. A provider always has the burden of proof to show that services were, in fact, rendered as 
billed. 
(J) The burden of proof as to a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be 
required in the absence of further evidence. 
(viii) Ex Parte Communications 
(A) Except as otherwise provided below, ex parte communications are prohibited. 
(B) The hearing officer shall decline to listen to or accept any communication offered in violation of this rule and 
shall explain to the offeror that any communication received off the record and in violation of this rule must be 
made a part of the record and furnished to all parties. 
(C) This rule shall NOT apply to: the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law; or communications 
concerning status of the hearing and uncontested procedural matters. 
(ix) Continuances or Further Hearings 
(A) The hearing officer may continue a formal hearing to another time or place, or order a further hearing on 
his own motion or upon the showing of good cause, at the request of any party. 
(B) Where the hearing officer determines that additional evidence is necessary for the proper determination of 
the case, he may at his discretion: continue the hearing to a later date and order the party to produce additional 
evidence; or close the hearing and hold the record open in order to permit the introduction of additional 
documentary evidence. Any evidence so submitted shall be made available to both parties and each party shall 
have the opportunity for rebuttal. 
(C) Written notice of the time and place of a continued or further hearing shall be given in accordance with 
R410-14-2(l)(j)(ii)(A), except that when a continuance is ordered during a hearing and adequate oral notice is 
given. 
(x) Record 
A complete record of all formal hearings shall be made. The testimony shall be electronically recorded or 
memorialized by court reporter. The recording or memorialization shall be transcribed if requested by a party to 
the hearing. The requesting party shall pay the costs of transcription and for copying costs. At the conclusion of 
the formal hearing, the complete record of the hearing will be maintained in a secured area and shall be 
considered the sole property of DHCF. DHCF or its designated agent will retain electronic recordings/ 
memorialization of formal hearings for a period of one year. Written records and documents will be retained for a 
period not to exceed three years. 
(xi) Proposed Decision and Final Agency Review 
(A) At the conclusion of the formal hearing, the hearing officer shall take the matter under advisement and shall 
submit to the Executive Director of DOH a proposed decision, based on the evidence and testimony introduced at 
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the hearing. 
(B) The proposed decision shall be in writing and shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(C) The Executive Director of DOH may: adopt the proposed decision, or any portion of the decision; reject the 
proposed decision, or any portion thereof, and make his own independent determination based upon the record; or 
remand the matter to the hearing officer to take additional evidence; and the hearing officer thereafter shall submit 
to the Executive Director of DOH a new proposed decision. 
(D) Review by the Executive Director constitutes agency review and final administration action, and is subject to 
judicial review in accordance with the procedures set forth in R410-14-2(l)(j)(xiii). 
(E) The aggrieved person or his representative shall be notified of the final administrative action and the 
aggrieved person's right to judicial review of the action. 
(F) When the final administrative action is favorable to the aggrieved person, DHCF shall promptly take 
corrective action. 
(G) Subject to provisions for safeguarding confidential information, all hearing decisions shall be kept on file for 
public inspection. 
(xii) Agency Review. 
(A) Reconsideration. Section 63-46b-13 applies. 
(xiii) Judicial Review 
(A) Judicial review of a final agency action may be secured by the aggrieved party by filing a petition in the 
Utah Court of Appeals within 30 days after issuance of the Executive Director's final administrative action. The 
petition shall be served upon the Executive Director and shall state the grounds upon which review is sought. The 
Executive Director shall file with his Answer certified documents, papers, transcripts of all testimony taken in the 
matter, recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer and the final administrative 
action of the Executive Director. 
(B) Judicial review of final administrative action is governed by Section 63-46b-16 and Section 63-46b-l, and 
Section 78-2a-3. 
R410-14-3. Discovery, 
(1) DISCOVERY PROVISIONS 
(a) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to these proceedings and no formal discovery except as 
set forth hereinafter shall be permitted. 
(b) Unless otherwise limited by order of the hearing officer, the scope of discovery in formal adjudicative 
proceedings shall be as follows: 
(i) Review of Applicant/Recipient and Provider Records 
(A) DHCF shall be permitted to review all records which are pertinent to the hearing which are in the custody or 
control of the applicant or recipient and their health care providers. DHCF shall give at least three days' written 
notice to the custodian of such document(s). 
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•LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: None. 
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DAR File No. 19714 
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AUTHORIZED BY: Rod Betit, Executive Director 
R414. Health, Health Care Financing, Coverage and 
Reimbursement Policy. 
R414-1. Utah Medicaid Program, 
R414-1-1. Introduction and Authority. 
(1) This rule fis the general rule that denotes! generally 
characterizes the scope of the Medicaid Program in Utah, and 
defines all of the provisions necessary to administer the 
program. 
(2) The rule is authorized by Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act, and Sections 26-1-5, 26-18-2.1, 26-18-2.3, 
UCA. 
R414-1-2. Definitions. 
The following definitions are used throughout the rules of 
the Division: 
(1) "Act" means the federal Social Security Act. 
(2) "Applicant" means any person who requests 
assistance under the medical programs available through the 
Division. 
(3) "Categorically needy" means aged, blind or disabled 
individuals or families and children: 
(a) who are otherwise eligible for Medicaid and who 
meet the financial eligibility requirements for AFDC, SSI, or 
an optional State supplement or are considered under section 
1619(b) of the federal Social Security Act to be SSI recipients; 
or 
(b) whose categorical eligibility is protected by statute. 
(4) "Code of Federal Regulations" (CFR) means the 
publication by the Office of die Federal Register, specifically 
Title 42, used to govern the administration of the Medicaid 
Program. 
(5) "Client" means a person the Division or its duly 
constituted agent has determined to be eligible for assistance 
under the Medicaid program. 
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(6) "Department" means the Department of Health. 
(7) "Director" means the director of the Division. 
(8) "Division" means the Division of Health Care 
Financing within the Department. 
(9) "Emergency medical condition" means a medical 
condition showing acute symptoms of sufficient severity that 
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably 
be expected to result in; 
ftri placing the patient's health in serious ieonardv: 
(b) serious impairment to bodily functions: 
(c) serious dysfunction of anv bodifv organ or part: or 
(d) death. 
(101 "Emergency service" means immediate medical 
attention and service performed to treat an emergency medical 
condition. Immediate medical attention is treatment rendered 
within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms or within 24 hours 
pf diagnosis. 
(\\) "Emergency Services Only Program" means a 
health program designed to cover a specific range of 
emergency services. 
([9]J2) "Executive Director" means the executive 
director of the Department. 
(1[0]2) "InterOual- means the InterQual Medical Review 
Criteria and System, fthatla comprehensive, clinically based, 
patient focused medical review criteria and system developed 
by InterQual Inc.[, who is on contract with the Division, and 
is adopted and incorporated by reference?] 
£141 "Medicaid agency* means the Department of 
Health. 
OfflS "Medical assistance program" or "Medicaid 
program" means the state program for medical assistance for 
persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant 
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act; as 
implemented by Title 26, Chapter 18, UCA. 
(1[2]£) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services 
furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients under 
medical programs available through the Division. 
(1[9]2) "Medically needy" means aged, blind, or 
disabled individuals or families and children who are otherwise 
eligible for Medicaid, who are not categorically needy, and 
whose income and resources are within limits set under the 
Medicaid State Plan. 
(l[4]g) "Provider" means any person, individual or 
corporation, institution or organization, qualified to perform 
services available under the Medicaid program and who has 
entered into a written contract with the Medicaid program. 
(1[5]2) "Recipient" means a person who has received 
medical or hospital assistance under the Medicaid program. 
([*6]2£D "Undocumented alien" means an alien who is 
not recognized by Immigration and Naturalization Services as 
being lawfully present in the United States. 
R414-1-3. Single State Agency. 
The Utah Department of Health is the Single State 
Agency designated to administer or supervise the 
administration of the Medicaid program under Title XIX of the 
federal Social Security Act.[ All references to "the Medicaid 
agency" mean the agency named in this section.] 
R414-1-4. Medical Assistance Unit. 
Within the Utah Department of Health, the Division of 
Health Care Financing has been designated as the medical 
assistance unit. 
R414-1-5. State Plan. 
As a condition for receipt of federal funds under title XK 
of the Act, the Utah Department of Health must submit a State 
Plan contract to the federal government for the medical 
assistance program, and agree to administer the program in 
accordance with the provisions of the State Plan, the 
requirements of Titles XI and XIX of the Act, and ail 
applicable federal regulations and other official issuances of 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services. 
A copy of the State Plan is available for public inspection at 
the Division's offices during regular business hours. 
R414-1-6. Services Available. 
(1) Medical or hospital services available under the 
Medical Assistance Program are generally limited by federal 
guidelines as set forth under Title XIX of the federal Social 
Security Act and Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR). 
(2) The following services provided in the State Plan are 
available to both the categorically needy and medically needy: 
(a) inpatient hospital services, with the exception of those 
services provided in an institution for mental diseases; 
(b) outpatient hospital services and rural health clinic 
services; 
(c) other laboratory and x-ray services; 
(d) skilled nursing facility services, other than services 
in an institution for mental diseases, for individuals 21 years 
of age or older; 
(e) early and periodic screening and diagnoses of 
individuals under 21 years of age, and treatment of conditions 
foundA are provided in accordance with federal requirements; 
(f) family planning services and supplies for individuals 
of child-bearing age; 
(g) physician's services, whether furnished in the office, 
the patient's home, a hospital, a skilled nursing facility, or 
elsewhere; 
(h) podiatrist's services; 
(i) optometrist's services; 
(j) psychologist's services; 
Art interpreter's services: 
([k]D home health services: 
(i) intermittent or part-time nursing services provided by 
a home health agency; 
(ii) home health aide services by a home health agency; 
and 
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(iii) medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable 
for use in the home; 
(fflm) private duty nursing services for children under 
age 21; 
([m]n) clinic services; 
([n]fi) dental services; 
(Wfi) physical therapy and related services; 
(Wo) services for individuals with speech, hearing, and 
language disorders furnished by or under the supervision of a 
speech pathologist or audiologist; 
(Mr) prescribed drugs, dentures, and prosthetic devices 
and eyeglasses prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of 
the eye or by an optometrist; 
(Ms) other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and 
rehabilitative services other than those provided elsewhere in 
the State Plan; 
(Ml) services for individuals age 65 or older in 
institutions for mental diseases: 
(i) inpatient hospital services for individuals age 65 or 
older in institutions for mental diseases; 
(ii) skilled nursing services for individuals age 65 or 
older in institutions for mental diseases; and 
(iii) intermediate care facility services for individuals age 
65 or older in institutions for mental diseases; 
(WlO intermediate care facility services, other than[ 
sueh] services in an institution for mental diseasesfr]. These 
services are for [personalindividuals determined, in accordance 
with section 1902(a)(31)(A) of the Social Security Act, to be 
in need of fsueh]this care, including those services furnished 
in a public institution [or a distinct part thereof ]for the 
mentally retarded or for [persons!individuals with related 
conditions; 
(My) inpatient psychiatric facility services for 
individuals under 22 years of age; 
([v]wj nurse-midwife services; 
([w]20 family or pediatric nurse practitioner services; 
(My) hospice care in accordance with section 1905(o) of 
the Social Security Act; 
([y]z) case management services in accordance with 
section 1905(a)(19) or section 1915(g) of the Social Security 
Act; 
(MM) extended services to pregnant womena [including 
Ipregnancv-related services, faftd-lpostpartum services for 60 
days[ after the pregnancy ends], and[ including] additional 
services for any other medical conditions that may complicate 
pregnancy[-with increases of service]; 
([fttt]bk) ambulatory prenatal care for pregnant women 
furnished during a presumptive eligibility period by a qualified 
provider in accordance with section 1920 of the Social Security 
Act; and 
([bb]££) other medical care and other types of remedial 
care recognized under state law, specified by the Secretary of 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services, 
pursuant to 42 CFR 440.60 and [42-€Ffc-]440.170, including: 
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(i) medical or remedial [care or Jservicesfc] provided by 
licensed practitioners, other than physician's services, within 
the scope of practice as defined by state law; 
(ii) transportation services; 
(iii) skilled nursing facility services for patients under 21 
years of age; 
(iv) emergency hospital services; and 
(v) personal care services in the recipient's home, 
prescribed in [accordance -with -]a plan of treatment and 
provided by a qualified person* under the supervision of a 
registered nurse. 
R414-1-7. [Undocumented ]Aliens. 
(1) Certain qualified aliens described in Title IV of 
Public Law 104-193 may be eligible for the Medicaid 
program, All pther alien? are prohibited from receiving non-
emergency services, as described in Section 1903fv> of 
the[Undocumcntcd aliens arc eligible for emergency services 
only, as noted in the] Social Security Act[, Section 1903(v)], 
which is adopted and incorporated by reference^—Nen-
cmcrgeney—services—are—not—a Medicaid—benefit—for 
undocumented aliens.] 
(2) Aliens who are prohibited from receiving non-
emergency servicesf An undocumented alien eligible under the 
Emergency Services Only Program] will have "Emergency 
Services Only Program" printed on fhtsltheir Medical 
Identification Cards, as noted in R414-3A. 
R414-1-8. Statewide Basis. 
The [M]medical [Assistance [Pfcrogram is state; 
administered and[-»-m] operat£$[ten] on a statewide basis in 
accordance with[ all requirements of] 42 CFR 431.50. 
R414-1-9. Medical Care Advisory Committee. 
There is a[n] Medical Care felAdvisorv [e]£ommittee 
that advises the Medicaid agency directorfto the Medicaid 
agency director] on health and medical care servicesx[-and] 
The committee is established in accordance with [and meeting 
all the requirements of ]42 CFR 431.12. 
R414-1-10. Discrimination Prohibited. 
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 70b), and the 
regulations at 45 CFR Parts 80 and 84, the Medicaid agency 
assures that no individual shall be subjected to discrimination 
under the plan on the grounds of race, color, gender, national 
origin, or handicap. 
R414-1-11. Administrative Hearings. 
The Medicaid agency has a system of administrative 
hearings for medical providers and dissatisfied applicants, 
clients^ and recipients that meets all the requirements of 42 
CFR Part 431, Subpart E. 
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R414-1-12. Utilization Review. 
m In order to approve or deny payment of claims. 
[T]the Medicaid agency shall use InterQual [medical review 
criteria and system ]to determine medical necessity^] and 
appropriateness of services. The InterQual Medical Review 
Criteria and System, published bv InterQual. Inc.. January. 
1997. is adopted and incorporated bv reference. 
(2) InterQual shall not apply to services that are; 
(a) excluded as a Medicaid benefit bv rule; 
(b) provided in an intensive physical rehabilitation center 
as described in R414-2P; or 
(c) organ transplant services as described in R414-10A. 
In these three exceptions, or where InterQual is silent, the 
Medicaid agency shall approve or deny claims based upon 
appropriate administrative rules or its own criteria as 
incorporated in provider contracts that incorporate the 
Medicaid Provider Manuals.f. and subsequent approval or 
non approval of payment for services, except for services that 
arc not a Medicaid benefit, or services provided in an intensive 
physical rehabilitation center as described in R414-2B, or for 
organ transplant services.—In these exceptions, the agency 
shall use appropriate administrative rules or its own criteria as 
listed in the Medicaid Provider Manuals.] 
R414-1-13. Provider Agreements. 
All requirements of 42 CFR 431.107 are met with respect 
to agreements between the Medicaid agency and each provider 
furnishing services under the plan. 
R414-M4. Utilization Control. 
The Medicaid agency has implemented TAIa statewide 
program of surveillance and utilization control[ has been 
implemented] that safeguards against unnecessary or 
inappropriate use of Medicaid services available under the 
plan. The plan also safeguardsftmdl against excess payments, 
and[-that] assesses the quality of services. The program meets 
ihe_requirements of 42 CFR Part 456[-are-met]. 
R414-1-15. Medicaid Fraud. 
The Medicaid agency has established and will maintain 
methods, criteria, and procedures that meet all requirements 
of 42 CFR 455.13 through 455.21 for prevention and control 
of program fraud and abuse. 
R414-M6. Confidentiality. 
[Uftder-s]£tate statute, Title 63, Chapter 2, and Section 
26-1-17.5, [whieh-]impose[s] legal sanctions^] and provide 
safeguards! are provided] that restrict the use or disclosure of 
information concerning applicants, clients* and recipients to 
purposes directly connected with the administration of the 
plan. 
All other requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Subpart F are 
met. 
R414-1-17. Eligibility Determinations. 
Determinations of eligibility for Medicaid under the plan 
are made by the Division of Health Care Financing and the 
Utah Department of WorkforcefHttmanl Services. There is a 
written agreement between the Utah Department of Health and 
the Utah Department of WorkforcefHttman] Services. The 
agreement defines the relationships and respective 
responsibilities of the agencies. 
R414-1-18. Professional Standards Review Organization, 
All other provisions of the State Plan are administered by 
the Medicaid agency or its agents according to written 
contract* except for those functions for which final authority 
has been granted to a Professional Standards Review 
Organization under Title XI of the Act. 
R414-1-19. Timeliness in Eligibility Determinations. 
The Medicaid agency meets all timeliness requirements 
of 42 CFR Part 435, Subpart JA for processing applications, 
determining eligibility* and furnishing Medicaid. 
R414-1-20. Residency. 
Medicaid is famished to eligible individuals who are 
residents of the State under 42 CFR 435.403. 
R414-1-21. Out-of-state Services. 
Medicaid services are available to eligible residents of the 
state who are temporarily in another state. Reimbursement for 
out-of-state services shall be provided in accordance with 42 
CFR 431.52fia furnished under the conditions specified in 42 
CFR 431.52 to an eligible individual who is a resident of the 
state while the individual is in another state, to the same extent 
that Medicaid is furnished to residents in the state]. 
R414-1-22. Retroactive Coverage. 
Individuals are entitled to Medicaid services under the 
plan during the three months preceding the month of 
application^] if they were, or would have been, eligible at that 
time. 
R414-1-23. Freedom of Choice of Provider. 
Unless an exception under 42 CFR 431.55 applies, any 
individual eligible under the plan may obtain Medicaid 
services from any institution, pharmacy, person, or 
organization that is qualified to perform the services and has 
entered into a Medicaid provider contract, including an 
organization that provides these services or arranges for their 
availability on a prepayment basis. 
R414-1-24. Availability of Program Manuals and Policy 
Issuances. 
In accordance with 42 CFR 431.18. the state office, local 
offices, and all district offices of the Department maintain 
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responsibilities, and services, These manuals, policy 
issuances, and rules are available for examination and, upon 
request, are available to individuals for review, study, or 
reproductionrProgram manuals and other policy issuances that 
affect recipients, providers, and the public, including the 
Medicaid agency's rules governing eligibility, need, and 
amount of assistance, recipient right3 and responsibilities, and 
services offered by the agency arc maintained in the state 
office and in each local and district office for examination and, 
upon request, arc available to individuals for review, study, or 
reproduction. All requirements of 42 CFR 431.18 arc met]. 
R414-1-25. General Rule Format. 
The following format is used generally throughout the 
rules of the Division. Section headings as indicated and the 
following general definitions [thereunder ]are for guidance 
only. The section headings are not part of the rule content 
itself. In certain instances, this format may not be appropriate 
and will not be implemented due to the nature of the subject 
matter of a specific rule. 
(1) Introduction and Authority. A concise statement as 
to what Medicaid service is covered by the rule, and a listing 
of specific federal statutes and regulations and state statutes 
that authorize or require the rule. 
(2) Definitions. Definitions that have special meaning to 
the particular rule. 
(3) Client Eligibility. Categories of Medicaid clients 
eligible for the service covered by the rule: Categorically 
Needy or Medically Needy or both. Conditions precedent to 
the client's obtaining coverage such as age limitations or 
otherwise. 
(4) Program Access Requirements. Conditions precedent 
external to the client's obtaining service^ such as type of 
certification needed from attending physician, whether 
available only in an inpatient setting or otherwise. 
(5) Service Coverage. Detail of specific services 
available under the rule, including limitations^ such as number 
of procedures in a given period of time or otherwise. 
(6) Prior Authorization. As necessary, a description of 
the procedures for obtaining prior authorization for services 
available under the particular rule. However, prior 
authorization must not be used as a substitute for regulatory 
practice that should be in rule. 
(7) Other Sections. As necessary under the particular 
rule, additional sections may be indicated. [Include o]Qther 
sections incJudfifte-detetl] regulatory language that does not fit 
into sections (1) through (5). 
KEY: medicaid 
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R414. Health, Health Care Financing, Coverage and 
Reimbursement Policy. 
R414-10A. Transplant Services Standards. 
R414-10A-1. Introduction and Authority. 
(1) This rule establishes standards and criteria for tissue 
and organ transplantation services. 
(2) [seteeted]Section 9507 of the federal Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 
codified as section 1903(i)(l) of the Social Security Act, 
requires states, as part of the Medicaid program, to establish 
standards for coverage of transplantation services. 
(3) Under the ruling issued by the Federal District Court 
for the District of Utah, Central Division, Civil No. 96405, 
the Department of Health has absolute discretion to fund 
transplantation services under Title XTX of the Social Security 
Act and if transplantation services are covered, there must be -
no discrimination on the basis of age. 
R414-10A-2. Definitions. 
For purposes of R414-10A: 
(1) "Abstinence" means the documented non-use of any 
abusable psychoactive substance. 
(2) "Active infection" means current presumptive 
evidence of invasion of tissue or body fluids by bacteria, 
viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or parasites which is not 
demonstrated to be effectively controlled by the host, antibiotic 
or antimicrobial agents. 
(3) "Age group" means patients documented in the 
medical literature with an age at the time of transplantation 
related to the current age of the client as listed below: 
(a) Birth through 12 months; 
(b) One through 12 years; 
(c) 13 through 20 years; 
(d) 21 through 30 years; 
(e) 31 through 40 years; or 
(f) 41 through 54 years. 
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(g) Department medical consultants may consider other 
age groups, documented by the medical literature and the 
transplant center to have conclusive relevance to the client's 
survival. 
(4) "Active substance abuse" means the current use of 
any abusable psychoactive substance which is not appropriately 
prescribed and taken under the direction of a physician or is 
not medically indicated. 
(5) "Allogenic" means having a different genetic 
constitution but belonging to the same species. 
(6) "Autologous" means the products or components of 
the same individual person. 
(7) "Client" means an individual eligible to receive 
covered Medicaid services from an enrolled Medicaid 
provider. 
(8) "Department" means the Utah Department of Health. 
(9) "Emergency transplantation" means any 
transplantation which for reasons of medical necessity requires 
that a transplant be performed less than five days after 
determination of the need for the [proccdure.clicnts 
oflprocedure. 
(10) "Intestine transplantation" means transplantation of 
both the small bowel and colon. 
(11) "Medical literature" means articles and medical 
information which have been peer reviewed and accepted for 
publication or published. 
(12) "Medically necessary" means a client's medical 
condition which meets all the criteria and none of the 
contraindications for the type of transplantation 
f requested .hereby] requested. 
(13) "Multiple transplantations" means, except for 
corneas, the transplantation of more than one tissue or organ 
during the same or different operative procedure. 
(14) "Multiviscerai transplantation" means the 
transplantation of liver, pancreas, omentum, stomach, small 
intestine and colon. 
(15) "Patient" means a feHentlperson who is receiving 
covered professional services provided or directed by a 
licensed practitioner of the healing arts enrolled as a Medicaid 
provider. 
(16) "Remission" means the lack of any evidence of the 
leukemia on physical examination and hematological 
evaluation, including normocellular bone marrow with less 
than five percent blast cells, and peripheral blood counts 
within normal values, except for clients who are receiving 
maintenance chemotherapy. 
(17) "Services" means the type of medical assistance 
specified in sections 1905(a)(1) through (24) of the Social 
Security Act and interpreted in the 42 CFR Section 440, 
Subpart A, October 1992 edition, which is adopted and 
incorporated by reference. 
(18) "Substance abuse rehabilitation program" means a 
rehabilitation program developed and conducted by an 
inpatient facility that, at a minimum, meets the standards of 
organization and staff of a chemical dependency/substance 
abuse specialty hospital specified in R432-102-4.5. 
(19) "Syngeneic" means possessing identical genotypes, 
as monozygotic or identical twins. 
(20) "Transplantation" means the transfer of a human 
organ or tissue from one person to another or from one site to 
another in the same individual, except for skin, tendon, and 
bone. 
(21) "Vital end-organs" means organs of the body 
essential to life, e.g., the heart, the liver, the lungs, and the 
brain. 
R414-10A-4. Program Access Requirements. 
(1) Transplantation services may be provided only for 
those eligible clients who meet the criteria listed in R414-10A-
6 through 22 for services covered under the Utah Medicaid 
program. 
(2) Transplantation services for the organ needed by the 
client may be provided only in a transplant center approved by 
the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
as a Medicare designated center or by the Department in 
accordance with criteria in R414-10A-7. 
(3) Transplantation services may be provided out-of-state 
only when the authorized service is not available in an 
approved facility in the state of Utah. 
(4) Criteria listed in R414-10A applicable to 
transplantation services and transplant centers in the state of 
Utah also apply to out-of-state transplant services and 
facilities. 
(5) Post transplant authorization for transplantation 
services provided under unusual, emergency circumstances 
may be given only when: 
(a) all Utah Medicaid criteria listed in R414-10A-6 
through 22 are met; and 
(b) both the transplant center and the board-certifiedJQI 
board-eligible specialist evaluation required by R414-10A-6 (3) 
(0. (p)» (q)» and (r) are submitted with the recommendation 
that the tissue or organ transplantation be authorized. 
R414-10A-5. Service Coverage. 
(1) Transplantation services are covered by the Utah 
Medicaid program only when criteria listed in R414-10A-6 
through 22 are met. 
(2) Transplantations which are experimental or 
investigational or which are performed on an experimental or 
investigational basis are not covered. 
(3) Multiple transplantation services may be provided 
only when the criteria for the specific multiple transplantations 
are met. 
(4) Staff shall not consider criteria for single tissue or 
organ transplantation in reviewing requests for multiple 
transplantations. 
2 
0 0 0 0 0 5 4 
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE DAR File No. 
(5) Transplantation of additional tissues or organs, 
different from prior transplantations, may be provided only 
when the criteria for multiple transplantations of all provided 
or scheduled multiple tissue or organ transplantations are met. 
(6) Repeat transplantations of the same tissues or organs 
may be provided only when documentation reviewed by 
Department staff and medical consultants shows that criteria 
for transplantation of the specific tissues or organs are met. 
([4]2) Emergency transplantations may be provided only 
when the service is provided for a transplantation with criteria 
approved in R414-10A-6 through 22. Payment will not be 
made until Department staff has reviewed all of the 
information required by R414-10A-6 through 22 and 
determined that the patient and the transplant center met 
criteria for approval and provision of the service at the time of 
the transplantation. 
R414-10A-6. Prior Authorization. 
(1) Prior authorization is required for all transplantation 
services except for cornea and kidney transplantation. 
(2) The prior authorization request for transplantation 
services must be initiated by the client's referring physician. 
Failure to submit all required information with the prior 
authorization request will delay processing of the request for 
transplantation. 
(3) The initial request for prior authorization of any 
transplantation, except cornea or kidney, must contain all of 
the following information and documentation: 
(a) Request for Prior Authorization Form 24-06-37, 
completed and signed by the physician. 
(b) A description of the medical condition which 
necessitates a transplantation. 
(c) The client's prognosis, with and without a transplant, 
including estimated life expectancy. 
(d) Transplantation treatment alternatives utilized 
previous to the transplantation request. 
(e) Transplantation treatment alternatives considered and 
discarded, including discussion of why the alternatives have 
been discarded. 
(f) Comprehensive examination, evaluation and 
recommendations completed by a board-certified or board-
eligible specialist in a field directly related to the client's 
condition which necessitates the transplantation, such as a 
nephrologist, gastroenterologist, cardiologist, or hematologist. 
(g) Comprehensive psycho-social evaluation of the client 
by a board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrist. The 
evaluation must include a comprehensive history regarding 
substance abuse and compliance with medical treatment. 
(h) Psycho-social evaluation of parent(s) or guardian(s) 
of the client, by a board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrist 
if the client is less than 18 years of age. The psycho-social 
evaluation must include a comprehensive history regarding 
substance abuse, and past and present compliance with medical 
treatment. 
(i) Comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of the client, if 
the client has a history of mental illness. 
(j) Comprehensive psychological or developmental 
testing, as requested by the Department. 
(k) Comprehensive infectious disease evaluation for a 
client with a recent or current suspected infectious episode. 
(1) Documentation by the client's referring physician that 
a client with a history of substance abuse has successfully 
completed a substance abuse program or has documented 
abstinence for a period of at least six months before any 
transplantation service can be authorized. 
(m) Hospital and outpatient records for at least the last 
two years, unless the patient is less than two years of age, in 
which case all records. 
(n) Any other medical evidence needed to evaluate 
possible contraindications for the type of transplantation being 
considered. Contraindications are listed in this rule under each 
[selected jorgan or transplant type. 
(o) The transplant center must document, by a current 
medical literature review, a one-year survival rate ffoflfrom 
patients having received transplantation for the age group, 
specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of transplantation 
proposed for the client. Survival rate must be calculated by 
the Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life 
table method: "Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric 
estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of American 
Statistical Association 53:457-481, 1958. Cox, D.R., Oakes, 
D. Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." 
adopted and incorporated by reference. At least ten patients 
in the appropriate age group must be alive at the end of the one 
or three year period to document adequate confidence 
intervals. The Department shall use independent research by 
staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation 
submitted by the transplant center. 
(p) The transplant center must document by a current 
medical literature review, a one year graft function rate for 
patients having received pancreas, kidney or small bowel 
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), 
condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. 
Graft function rate must be calculated by the Kaplan-Meier 
product-limit method or the actuarial life table method: 
"Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from 
incomplete observations. Journal of American Statistical 
Association 53:457-481, 1958. Cox, D.R., Oakes, D. 
Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted 
and incorporated by reference. The time to graft failure will 
be determined by the use of insulin post-pancreas 
transplantation, by the use of dialysis post-renal 
transplantation, and the use of total parenteral nutrition post-
small bowel transplantation. At least ten patients in the 
appropriate age group must have documented graft function at 
the end of the one year period to document adequate 
confidence intervals. The Department shall use independent 
research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the 
documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
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(q) Bone marrow transplantation centers must document, 
by a current medical literature review, a one-year and a three-
year survival rate from patients having received transplantation 
for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client. The Department shall 
use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(r) The transplant center must provide written 
recommendations for each client which support the need for 
the transplant. The recommendations must reflect use of both 
the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and the 
Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-8 
through 22. Agreement of the transplant center to provide the 
required service must also be established. 
(s) The physician must provide, for review by the 
Department, any additional medical information which could 
affect the outcome of the specific transplant being requested. 
(t) The completed request for authorization, along with 
all required information and documentation, must be delivered 
to: 
Utah Department of Health 
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy 
Utilization Management Unit 
Transplant Coordinator 
288 North 1460 West 
Box 142904 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2904 
R414-10A-7. Criteria for Transplantation Centers or 
Facilities. 
Transplantation services are covered only in a transplant 
center or facility which demonstrates the following 
qualifications to the Department: 
(1) Compliance with criteria listed in R414-10A-6 
through 22. 
(2) The transplant center must document cost 
effectiveness and quality of service. The transplant center 
must complete, and submit to the Department for evaluation, 
documentation specific to the surgical experience of the 
requesting transplant center, showing applicable one and three 
year survival rates for all patients receiving transplantation in 
the last three years. The Department shall use independent 
research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the 
documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(3) Out-of-state transplant centers must meet all of the 
criteria and requirements listed by the Department in R414-
10A-6 through 22. 
(4) Transplantation services are covered in out-of-state 
transplant centers only when the service is not available in an 
approved facility in Utah, and agreement is reached between 
the Department and the requesting physician that service out-
of-state is essential to the individual case. 
(5) Reimbursement to out-of-state transplant centers is 
provided only when the transplant center and the Department 
can agree upon arrangements which [reasonably ]conform to 
the Department payment methodology. 
(6) Corneal transplant facilities must document: 
(a) certification or licensure by the Department as an 
ambulatory surgical center or an acute care general hospital; 
and 
(b) that the surgeon is board-certified or board-eligible 
in ophthalmology. 
(7) Heart, kidney, and liver transplant centers must 
document all of the following: 
(a) Current approval by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services as a Medicare-designated center for 
transplantation of the organ needed by the client. 
(b) Current full membership in the United Network for 
Organ Sharing for the specific organ transplantation needed by 
the client. 
(8) Bone marrow transplant centers must document the 
following: 
(a) Approval to provide autologous or allogenic bone 
marrow transplantation from at least one of the following: 
(i) Children's Cancer Study Group approval as a bone 
marrow transplantation center for autologous or allogenic bone 
marrow. 
(ii) Southwest Oncology Group approval as a bone 
marrow transplantation center for autologous or allogenic bone 
marrow. 
(iii) National Marrow Donor Program approval as a bone 
marrow transplantation center for allogenic bone marrow. 
(b) Payment will be made for autologous bone marrow 
transplantation services only if the transplantation center can 
document approval by at least one of the agencies named in 
R414-10A-7(l)through (7), and (8)(a)(i) or (ii) of this rule as 
an approved autologous bone marrow transplantation center. 
(c) Payment will be made for allogenic bone marrow 
transplantation services only if the transplantation center can 
document approval by at least one of the agencies named in 
R414-10A-7(l)through (7), and(8)(a)(i) through (iii) of this 
rule as an approved allogenic bone marrow transplant center. 
(9) Lung transplant centers must have a current full 
membership in the United Network for Organ Sharing for lung 
transplantation. 
R414-10A-9. Criteria and Contraindications for Bone 
Marrow Transplantation. 
(1) Bone marrow transplantation services may be 
provided for a Medicaid eligible client of any age who meets 
the following criteria. 
(2) The client for bone marrow transplantation must meet 
requirements of R414-10A-9(2)(a) or (b). 
(a) Allogenic and syngeneic bone marrow 
transplantations may be approved for payment only when die 
client has an HLA-matched donor. The donor must be 
compatible for all or a five-out-of-six match of World Health 
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Organization recognized HLA-A, -B, and -DR antigens as 
determined by appropriate serologic typing methodology. 
(i) A search of related family members, for a suitable 
donor, is authorized for payment only after a written prior 
authorization request has been received by the Department. 
(ii) A search of unrelated persons by HLA-type, for a 
suitable donor, will not be authorized for payment by the 
Department until the client has been documented to meet all 
other criteria in this rule for bone marrow transplantation 
except an HLA-matched donor. 
(iii) The transplant center staff must complete, and 
submit to the Department for evaluation, a current medical 
literature review, documenting a [maximumlminimum 
probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater 
than or equal to 75 percent one-year survival rate, or by 
having a greater than or equal to 55 percent three-year survival 
rate or by meeting the one-year and three-year survival rates 
for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation for the age 
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition, and type of 
transplantation proposed for the client. The Department shall 
use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(b) Autologous bone marrow or peripheral blood stem 
cell transplantation performed in conjunction with total body 
radiation or high dose chemotherapy, may be approved for 
payment only if a current medical literature review, completed 
by the transplant center staff and sent to the Department for 
staff review and evaluation, documenting a 
fmaximumlminimum probability of successful clinical outcome 
by having a greater than or equal to 75 percent one-year 
survival rate, or by having a greater than or equal to 55 
percent three-year survival rate or by meeting the one-year and 
three-year survival rates for patients receiving bone marrow 
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), 
condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. 
The Department shall use independent research by staff 
medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by 
the transplant center. 
(c) Clients for autologous bone marrow transplantations 
must have adequate marrow function and no evidence of 
marrow involvement by the primary malignancy at the time the 
marrow is harvested. 
(3) In addition to meeting the requirements of R414-10A-
9(2)(a) or (b), the client for bone marrow transplantation must 
meet the requirements of at least R414-10A-9(3)(a) or (b). 
(a) The client must have irreversible, progressive bone 
marrow disease with a life expectancy of one year or less 
without transplantation or must have greater than a five year 
increase in life expectancy with transplantation, with no other 
reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation 
available. 
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit 
to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical 
literature review documenting that the client's condition will 
cause irreversible, progressive disease to vital end-organs 
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within two years following the application for transplant and 
have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to 
transplantation available. The medical literature must also 
document that the bone marrow transplantation will prevent 
irreversible, progressive disease to the client's vital end-organs 
and must document that it will increase the life expectancy of 
the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate 
the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(4) In addition to meeting the requirements listed in 
R414-10A-9, (1) through (3), the client must meet all of the 
following requirements: 
(a) Medical assessment that the client is a reasonable risk 
for surgery with a likelihood of tolerance for 
immunosuppressive therapy. 
(b) Medical assessment by the client's referring physician 
that the client has sufficient mental, emotional and social 
stability and support to ensure that Ihelthe client and [his 
]parent(s) or guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the long-term 
follow-up and the immunosuppressive program which is 
required. 
(c) Psycho-social assessment by a board-certified or 
board-eligible psychiatrist that the client has sufficient mental, 
emotional and social stability and support to ensure that fhelthe 
client and [h«-]parent(s) or guardian(s) will strictly adhere to 
the long-term follow-up and the immunosuppressive program 
which is required. 
(d) The client must have a strong motivation to undergo 
the procedure as documented by the medical and psycho-social 
assessment. 
(e) If the client has a history of substance abuse, then the 
client must successfully complete a substance abuse 
rehabilitation program or must have documented abstinence for 
a period of at least six months before the Department reviews 
a request for transplantation services. 
(f) A current medical literature review, completed by the 
transplant center staff and submitted to the Department for 
staff review and evaluation, documenting that the underlying 
original bone marrow disease will not recur and limit survival 
to less than 75% one-year survival rate, or to less than 55% 
three-year survival rate. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate 
the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(5) Any single contraindication listed below precludes 
approval for Medicaid payment for bone marrow 
transplantation: 
(a) Active infection. 
(b) Acute severe hemodynamic compromise at the time 
of transplantation if accompanied by significant compromise of 
one or more vital end-organs. 
(c) Active substance abuse. 
(d) Presence of systemic dysfunction or malignant 
disease which could limit successful clinical outcome or 
interfere with compliance with a disciplined medical regimen 
or rehabilitation after transplantation. 
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(e) Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) antibody 
positive. 
(f) Neuropsychiatry disorder which could lead to non-
compliance or inhibit rehabilitation of the patient. 
(g) Pulmonary diseases: 
(i) Cystic fibrosis. 
(ii) Obstructive pulmonary disease (FEV1 less than 50% 
of predict[ftWe]ejl). 
(iii) Restrictive pulmonary disease (FVC less than 50% 
of predict[«We]eiD. 
(iv) Unresolved pulmonary roentgenographic 
abnormalities of unclear etiology. 
(v) Recent or unresolved pulmonary infarction. 
(h) Cancer, unless treated and eradicated for two or more 
years or unless a current medical literature review, completed 
by the transplant center staff and submitted to the Department 
for staff review and evaluation, documents a greater than or 
equal to 75% one-year survival rate, or a greater than or equal 
to 55 percent three-year survival rate, or by meeting the one-
year and three-year survival rates after transplantation for the 
age group, specific cancer, diagnosis(es), condition, and type 
of transplantation proposed for the client. The Department 
shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to 
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(i) Cardiovascular diseases: 
(i) Intractable cardiap arrhythmias, 
(ii) Symptomatic or occlusive peripheral vascular or 
cerebrovascular disease. 
(iii) Severe generalized arteriosclerosis. 
(j) Evidence of other major organ system disease or 
anomaly which could decrease the probability of successful 
clinical outcome or decrease the potential for rehabilitation. 
(k) Behavior pattern documented in the client's medical 
or psycho-social assessment which could interfere with a 
disciplined medical regimen. An indication of non-compliance 
by the client is documented by any of the following: 
(i) Non-compliance with medications or therapy. 
(ii) Failure to keep scheduled appointments. 
(iii) Leaving the hospital against medical advice. 
(iv) Active substance abuse. 
(6) Prior to the approval of transplantation, the 
transplantation team must document a plan of care, agreed to 
by the parent(s) or guardian(s) of a client who is under 18 
years of age, to assure compliance to medication and follow-up 
care, if an indication of non-compliance documented by any of 
the behaviors listed in R414-10A-9(5)(k)(i) through (iv) is 
demonstrated by the parent(s) or guardian(s) of the client. 
R414-10A-10. Criteria and Contraindications for Heart 
Transplantation. 
(1) Heart transplantation services may be provided for a 
Medicaid eligible client of any age who meets the following 
criteria. 
(2) The client for heart transplantation must meet 
requirements of at least R414-10A-10(2)(a) or (b). 
(a) The client must have irreversible, progressive heart 
disease, with a life expectancy of one year or less, or 
documented evidence of progressive pulmonary hypertension, 
and with no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to 
transplantation available. 
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit 
to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical 
literature review documenting that the client's condition will 
cause irreversible, progressive disease to vital end-organs 
within two years following the application for transplant and 
have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to 
transplantation available. The medical literature must also 
document that the heart transplantation will prevent 
irreversible, progressive disease to the client's vital end-organs 
and must document that it will increase the life expectancy of 
the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use 
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate 
the documentation submitted by the transplant center. 
(3) In addition to meeting at least one of the requirements 
listed in R414-10A-10(2), the client must meet all of the 
following requirements: 
(a) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit 
to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a current 
[published—]medical literature review documenting a 
probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater 
than or equal to 75 percent one-year survival rate for patients 
receiving heart transplantation for the age group, specific 
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed 
for the client. The Department shall use independent research 
by staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation 
submitted by the transplant center. 
(b) Severe cardiac dysfunction. 
(c) Medical assessment [by the client's referring 
physician ]that the client is a reasonable risk for surgery with 
a likelihood of tolerance for immunosuppressive therapy. 
(d) Medical assessment by the client's referring physician 
that the client has sufficient mental, emotional and social 
stability and support to ensure that the client and parent(s) or 
guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the long-term follow-up and 
the immunosuppressive program which is required. 
(e) Psycho-social assessment by a board-certified or 
board-eligible psychiatrist that the client has sufficient mental, 
emotional and social stability and support to ensure that the 
client and parent(s) or guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the 
long-term follow-up and the immunosuppressive program 
which is required. 
(f) The client must have strong motivation to undergo the 
procedure, as documented by the medical and psycho-social 
assessment. 
(g) If the client has a history of substance abuse, then the 
client must successfully complete a substance abuse 
rehabilitation program or must have documented abstinence for 
a period of at least six months before the Department reviews 
a request for transplantation services. 
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